Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2019

A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution
Bruce A. Green
Rebecca Roiphe

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

ARTICLES
A FIDUCIARY THEORY OF PROSECUTION
BRUCE A. GREEN* AND REBECCA ROIPHE**
Scholars have failed to arrive at a unifying theory of prosecution, one
that explains the complex role that prosecutors play in our democratic
system. This Article draws on a developing body of legal scholarship on
fiduciary theory to offer a new paradigm that grounds prosecutors’
obligations in their historical role as fiduciaries. Casting prosecutors as
fiduciaries clarifies the prosecutor’s obligation to seek justice, focuses
attention on the duties of care and loyalty, and prioritizes criminal justice
considerations over other public policy interests in prosecutorial charging
and plea-bargaining decisions. As fiduciaries, prosecutors are required to
engage in an explicit deliberative process for making these discretionary
decisions. Finally, fiduciary theory offers some insight into prosecutorial
regulation by clarifying that both accountability and independence are
aimed at aligning prosecutors’ interest with that of the public. This, in
turn, leads to the conclusion that proper regulation should aim to
maximize both and helps identify when one might be more beneficial than
the other.
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INTRODUCTION
Generations of scholars have failed to arrive at a unifying theory of
prosecution, one that explains the complex role that prosecutors play in
our democratic system. This Article draws on a developing body of legal
scholarship on fiduciary theory to offer a new understanding that
grounds prosecutors’ obligations in their historical role as fiduciaries.1
1. See, e.g., Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Ex Post: The NonContractual Basis of Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW
209, 209–10 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (contrasting fiduciary law with
contract law and arguing that fiduciary law “cannot be understood on the contractarian
model”); Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra, at 63 (defining the fiduciary relationship through a powers-based
theory); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
DUKE L.J. 879 (providing an overview of fiduciary principles while arguing that
analogizing fiduciary obligation with contract principles is a faulty approach); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 425–27
(1993) (explaining fiduciary duty through a contractual perspective, noting that the
duty of loyalty common in fiduciary relationships “replaces detailed contractual terms”);
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983) (analyzing the history and
nature of fiduciary relations as a group rather than by type of fiduciary); Stephen R.
Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Intentions, Compliance, and Fiduciary Obligations, 20 LEGAL
THEORY 106 (2014) (investigating the intentional obligation of loyalty in fiduciary
relations); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1399, 1401 (2002) (providing a uniform theory of fiduciary duty by differentiating
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This effort in turn contributes to the scholarship on fiduciary theory.
While scholars have used fiduciary theory to analyze the role of public
officials, including judges, they have not applied it to prosecutors, who
serve a fiduciary role not only as public officials but also as lawyers.2
We bring the theory to bear on two related but intransigent problems
that preoccupy scholars of prosecutorial ethics in the United States. The
first of these problems is how prosecutors should make discretionary
decisions, especially regarding charging and plea bargaining.3 The
second is how prosecutors should be held accountable for making these
discretionary
decisions
without
compromising
professional
independence.4 In making discretionary decisions, it is unclear how
prosecutors ought to identify relevant considerations and balance
competing public concerns. Unless we understand how prosecutors should
balance these various interests, it is difficult to determine how to hold
prosecutors accountable for failing to do so properly. Even if we could agree
about what constitutes a failure of discretionary decision making,
preserving prosecutorial independence requires some sacrifice in
monitoring and accountability.

between fiduciary and nonfiduciary relations and “rationaliz[ing] the content of
fiduciary obligations”).
2. E.g., Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV.
117, 117 (2006) (applying fiduciary principles to administrative law to minimize abuse
of discretion); Ethan J. Leib et al., A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699,
705 (2013) (applying fiduciary principles to the public law context and to the judiciary,
specifically); Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 513 (2015) (discussing a kind of fiduciary relationship in which the fiduciary is
charged with pursuing abstract interests instead of the interests of a person).
3. See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 876–78 (2009) (arguing that
prosecutors’ offices should take their cue from administrative law by separating
functions and increasing supervision); David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of
Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473, 480–83 (2016) (noting that
prosecutors have vast discretion and that prosecutorial power has only increased over
time).
4. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 959–60 (2009) (arguing that prosecutors’ offices
should change internal structure and management to regulate prosecutorial discretion);
Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 408–12 (2001) (arguing that prosecutors utilize
unrestrained discretion—that has no historical or constitutional justification—to
engage in misconduct that leaves victims with little to no remedy); Daniel C. Richman,
Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV.
939, 963–64 (1997).
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Recently, scholars have theorized unique qualities about fiduciary
relationships. They explain that all fiduciaries have discretionary power
over the beneficiary, who is inherently vulnerable.5 Beneficiaries are
asked to trust their important interests to the fiduciary, in part because
monitoring costs are usually high.6 Scholars have drawn on this work to
develop a theory of fiduciary governance, in which public officials, a
different but related brand of fiduciary, often serve an abstract interest
on behalf of the public.7 Prosecutors fit this mold because they pursue
the public’s abstract interest in justice. Scholars and critics have pointed
out both prosecutors’ vast discretion and the very real potential for
abuse at the public’s expense.8 While scholars have advanced different
theories of prosecution in this country,9 viewing prosecutors as
fiduciaries is more consistent with historical understandings and has a
greater practical value in shaping our understandings of what
prosecutors should do and how we ought to hold them accountable.
Most agree that prosecutorial discretion is an inevitable aspect of the
criminal justice system, but there is little consensus on how prosecutors
should prioritize competing concerns. Prosecutors tend to make
decisions in an impressionistic way, weighing multiple interests that
may be in tension, such as the interests in truth-seeking, legality,
deterrence, retribution, proportionality, equality, efficiency, and
economy. Respect for the legislature’s judgment in defining particular
conduct as a crime may suggest enforcing the criminal law whenever a
crime can be proven, but the legislature assumes that prosecutors will
not prosecute every guilty person because a punishment in a given case
may be unnecessarily harsh or costly. Prosecuting a particular

5. E.g., Miller, supra note 1, at 69–75.
6. Leib et al., supra note 2, at 706.
7. See Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 565–78 (illustrating that while distinct from
private fiduciary law, public fiduciary law is applicable to the judiciary, the executive
branch, and the legislative branch).
8. See Davis, supra note 4, at 436–39 (arguing that the “breadth of prosecutorial
discretion” available in the charging power leads to selective prosecution and other
forms of prosecutorial misconduct that have yet to be adequately addressed by the
Supreme Court or through other accountability mechanisms).
9. See Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(arguing that prosecutors owe an obligation to the law); Eric S. Fish, Prosecutorial
Constitutionalism, 90 S. CALIF. L. REV. 237, 253–54 (2017) (explaining that prosecutors
should enforce constitutional protections for defendants when the adversarial system
fails to do so); Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 607, 612 (1999) (arguing from both a historical and contemporary perspective that
prosecutors have a duty to seek justice).
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individual may deter that individual and others, but this abstract benefit
may not be worth the literal costs of the prosecution, not only to
taxpayers but to witnesses, jurors, and others. A conviction followed by
imprisonment would achieve deterrence but at a greater cost to both the
accused and the public. When multiple interests are in tension, the
challenge is to identify some decision-making criteria and processes for
prosecutors to employ, beyond simply “taking everything into account,”
both to give prosecutors guidance and to give the public a basis for
judging how well prosecutors are exercising discretion.
Courts and scholars of prosecution in the United States agree that
prosecutors have a duty to seek justice. Fiduciary theory helps make
that obligation less amorphous. Prosecutors, this Article argues, are
fiduciaries who represent the public but are appointed or elected to
pursue a particular abstract public interest, the interest in justice.10
Viewing prosecutors as fiduciaries, against the background of fiduciary
theory, makes three principal contributions.
First, this analysis focuses attention on the fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty that a prosecutor owes to the public as a beneficiary or client.
These duties are not incorporated in the duty to seek justice, which
speaks to the public’s principal objective in a criminal case. These are
further (but underexamined) duties that address the manner in which
prosecutors should pursue the public’s objectives. Analyzing duties of
loyalty and care shows that ordinary regulatory processes are less
robust for prosecutors than for other lawyers and other fiduciaries
generally, in that they fail both to define the nature of these duties and
to enforce them. From a normative perspective, this leaves a host of
unanswered, and potentially controversial, questions about how
prosecutors should conduct their work as competent and disinterested
public officials and professionals. From a regulatory perspective, the
implication is that, for prosecutors, a premium is placed on alternative
modes of accountability.
Second, fiduciary theory helps to narrow the appropriate
considerations for discretionary decisions. It does so by reminding us
that there may be relevant considerations that are not central to the
prosecutor’s fiduciary obligation to pursue the public’s interest in
justice. There are considerations that are intrinsic to determinations of
justice, meaning that they bear directly on the justness of a particular
prosecution. These intrinsic considerations include avoiding wrongful
10. See generally Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 523–24 (explaining that the role of
public fiduciaries often involves pursuit of an abstract interest on behalf of the public).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3529379

106

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:101

convictions, treating people proportionally and equally, and using the
process to incapacitate dangerous individuals, deter future offenses,
and secure retribution and restitution for victims. Extrinsic concerns, on
the other hand, may be relevant to a particular prosecutorial decision but
are not central to the justness of the case. These extrinsic concerns
include foreign policy implications of a particular prosecution or its
intersection with immigration policy. Prosecutors must balance intrinsic
concerns in light of the law, traditions, and facts that are necessarily
inaccessible to the public. They can also consider public concerns that are
extrinsic to the justness of a particular case so long as doing so would not
result in injustice. The fiduciary obligation to pursue the public’s interest
in justice makes that abstract goal primary and renders all other extrinsic
public interests subordinate. That prosecutors must mediate among a
constellation of interests,11 and give priority to criminal justice interests,
limits the extent to which prosecutors with different values can diverge
in their approach to decision making.12
Third, fiduciary theory helps narrow the range of proper prosecutorial
regulation. A related challenge in regulating prosecutors is achieving a
proper balance between prosecutorial accountability and independence.
It is essential to hold prosecutors accountable when they fail to fulfill their
obligations because the potential for harm is so grave. For example,
prosecutors at times fail to comply with the constitutional duty to provide
exculpatory evidence to the defense or abuse their authority in deciding
whether to institute criminal charges or to plea bargain.13 Although
critics call for greater accountability to address these abuses of power,14
both the structure of American government and the rule of law itself
require prosecutors, like judges, to be independent of those who might

11. Id.
12. Cf. Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution”, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 748, 770
(2018) (“The paradox of ‘progressive prosecution’ is that the criminal legal system is an
oppressive institution. Attempting to make the ‘most powerful’ actor in such an
institution more progressive seems to miss the point.” (footnote omitted)).
13. Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 51, 59–60 (2016).
14. See Barkow, supra note 3, at 874–84 (outlining prosecutors’ adjudicative and
enforcement powers and explaining how the accumulation of these powers is
problematic); Davis, supra note 4, at 395–448; Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias,
Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 381, 469–78 (2002) (discussing
the pros and cons of various methods for regulating prosecutorial conduct); Ronald F.
Wright, Reinventing American Prosecution Systems, 46 CRIME & JUST. 395, 396–99 (2017)
(explaining prosecutors’ role, along with the complicity of the legislature, in expanding
the incarceration rate).
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otherwise hold them accountable.15 It is more than just a theoretical
concern that if prosecutors were subject to direct oversight and control
by other government actors, politicians might seek to use prosecutors
to do their partisan or personal bidding, which would undermine
prosecutors’ fiduciary responsibility to pursue the public interest in
achieving justice.16 Independence also requires some distance from
factions of citizens with well-articulated interests, and it even requires
that prosecutors be insulated from (although perhaps not oblivious to)
a public consensus in favor of a particular act or outcome.17
Striking a balance between prosecutorial accountability and
independence is particularly difficult when it comes to charging and plea
bargaining because these decisions are both momentous and by nature
discretionary. When prosecutors, as trial lawyers, act unlawfully or
abusively in the manner in which they conduct criminal investigations and
proceedings, courts have constitutional and inherent authority to hold
them accountable.18 As a practical matter, courts tend to be circumspect in
their oversight of prosecutors’ investigative and trial conduct, but at least
as a legal matter, courts have considerable authority both to define and
remedy prosecutors’ trial misconduct and to sanction prosecutors for
wrongdoing in their role as advocates.19 In contrast, courts do not regulate
prosecutors’ charging and plea bargaining decisions except in the most
15. See generally Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the
Department of Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2018) (arguing that federal prosecutors are—
and must be—independent of the President).
16. See id. at 55 (describing how the professionalization of the DOJ emphasized
independence of prosecutors from partisan influence); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe,
May Federal Prosecutors Take Direction from the President?, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1817 (2019)
(discussing the “consequences for prosecutors who receive the president’s orders”).
17. This is essentially, on a more explicit and grander scale, the kind of independent
role that all lawyers are supposed to play. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of
Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 9–30 (1988). For a discussion of a judge’s failure to maintain
this sort of independence from the public, see Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Punishment
Without Process: “Victim Impact” Proceedings for Dead Defendants, FLR ONLINE (2019),
https://fordhamlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/
GreenRoiphe_November_FLRO_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE9N-V5WX].
18. See, e.g., Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 663 A.2d 317, 322 (Conn.
1995) (rejecting the claim that disciplining the state prosecutor would violate
separation of powers); State v. Davis, 972 P.2d 1099, 1105 (Kan. 1999) (affirming the
trial court’s order holding the prosecutor in criminal contempt for failing to comply with
discovery order). See generally Green & Zacharias, supra note 14, at 405–12 (describing
federal courts’ authority to regulate federal prosecutors).
19. Green & Zacharias, supra note 14, at 403–05 (explaining how federal courts can
directly and indirectly sanction prosecutors by reprimanding them off the record,
instituting fines, or negatively interpreting a particular prosecutor’s arguments).
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extreme situations.20 These discretionary decisions, which implicate
prosecutors’ role as public officials more than as trial lawyers, are free from
judicial review largely because judicial interference threatens to undermine
prosecutors’ effectiveness and inordinately entangle courts in executive
branch decision making. And yet, in many ways, decisions about whether to
initiate and dismiss criminal charges are prosecutors’ most significant ones
both for individual defendants and for the community and, therefore, are the
decisions for which prosecutors most need to be publicly accountable.
In addition to shedding light on how prosecutors should approach
decision making, fiduciary theory offers insight into how to achieve the
proper balance between accountability and independence in the context
of criminal prosecution. While at times in tension, prosecutorial
accountability and independence are not contradictory aspirations.
Both accountability and independence are mechanisms to promote and
protect prosecutors’ core fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Each
addresses risks that threaten to distort prosecutorial adherence to the
needs and interests of the public in achieving justice. While fiduciary
theory does not provide an algorithm for determining when to
emphasize one over the other, it may help to craft an institutional design
for prosecutors’ offices that can maximize both.
A key and often controversial question in determining the proper
balance between accountability and independence is how much control
the public ought to have over prosecutors either directly or through
other public monitors. Fiduciary theory may help solve this puzzle in
two ways. First, fiduciary theory helps clarify that both aims are
designed to ensure loyalty to the client, and second, it helps determine
which sorts of decisions need to be insulated from popular input and
control. The fiduciary obligation for prosecutors is to pursue the public’s
interest in justice. The public should not have direct input in
determining and weighing considerations that directly bear on criminal
justice in particular cases. These traditional criminal justice questions
are embodied in decisional law and the Constitution and developed by
the traditions and practices of prosecutors over time. The discretionary
power of prosecutors at the core of their fiduciary mission derives from
making these sorts of calculations in the best interest of the public rather
than at its behest. Extrinsic considerations that might also affect
prosecutors’ decisions, such as foreign policy questions or the intersection
20. See Davis, supra note 4, at 435–37 (describing how the Supreme Court has
promoted expansive prosecutorial discretion and discouraged challenges to
prosecutors’ abuse of the charging power).
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between prosecution and immigration policy, are less central to
prosecutors’ fiduciary mission, and there is no reason why the public either
directly or through other elected officials could not have more input into
these secondary public policy concerns.
Part I of this Article offers both historical and theoretical bases for
drawing on fiduciary theory to explain the U.S. prosecutor’s role. From
an historical perspective, prosecutors were, at times throughout early
American history, regarded as fiduciaries.21 Thought of as repositories
of a public trust, prosecutors are, like public officials generally,
fiduciaries. But most of these historical references are used as a
rhetorical flourish. They do not offer much in terms of content for the
unique relationship that prosecutors have to the public. For many of the
same reasons that theorists have cast public officials, including judges, as
fiduciaries, prosecutors too can be characterized as fiduciaries—that is, as
professionals who hold a trust and wield considerable discretion on behalf
of a vulnerable beneficiary. Drawing on the fiduciary theory of governance,
this Part concludes that while prosecutors’ beneficiary is the public,
prosecutors serve the public not by satisfying the preferences of an
amalgam of citizens at a particular moment in time but by pursuing the
abstract public interest in justice that is, and ought to be, elaborated
within prosecutors’ offices over time.
In Part II, we examine prosecutors’ role as a fiduciary, focusing on the
core fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. This exercise illuminates the
complexity of prosecutors’ role, particularly in making discretionary
charging and plea-bargaining decisions. Rather than simply relying on
intuition, prosecutors should explicitly and consciously consider particular
relevant factors. For the idea of justice to develop more particular meaning
over time, the policies and practices that surround the duty of loyalty and
care must be articulated, reviewed, and revised in the context of individual
investigations and prosecutions. By exploring the complex nature of
discretionary decision making, this section highlights the importance of both
accountability and independence.
Finally, in Part III, we consider whether fiduciary theory helps determine
how to enhance prosecutorial accountability and independence. We
conclude with cautious optimism. Fiduciary governance mandates a
balance between insulation and responsiveness. Prosecutors should be
insulated from direct popular control but only insofar as that allows them
to develop stable norms and principles governing decision making. To that
21. See Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 565–78 (explaining that public officials often
served as fiduciary on behalf of the public).
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end, oversight should include a mechanism for ensuring that prosecutors
are explicitly weighing proper concerns in making discretionary decisions
and developing more concrete goals and priorities that give substance to
the mandate to do justice. That oversight requires not only some degree of
transparency but also reciprocity. In other words, prosecutors ought to
serve as educators, explaining the value of the norms and traditions that
govern their work.
I. PROSECUTORS AS FIDUCIARIES—HISTORY AND THEORY
A. The Historical Background to U.S. Prosecutors’ Fiduciary Role
The shift from private to public prosecutions in America could be seen
as a shift from a private service model to a public fiduciary model.22 In
the Middle Ages, crime was originally seen as a personal offense, a
wrong inflicted on the victim.23 This view persisted through the
nineteenth century in England and America. Private prosecution in
England was justified, in part, as a restriction on the power of the
Crown.24 While a limited system of public prosecution developed over
time, England did not officially recognize public prosecution until 1879
when the Office of Public Prosecutions was created.25 In nineteenthcentury England, however, even private prosecutions were thought to
be brought in the public interest: the prosecutor “has as much a public
duty to discharge as the sovereign himself, and has a public trust to
exercise.”26
The American colonies borrowed significantly from the British system,
and early prosecutions were primarily brought by individual victims.
Colonists similarly resisted the public prosecution model as fraught with
the potential for abuse.27 However, a growing population, increased crime,
22. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Fiduciary Government and Public Officers’ Incentives, in
FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT 146, 156 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2018) (arguing that the shift
in public officials’ compensation from private to public funding demonstrates a shift
from a service model toward a fiduciary model of government).
23. Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 357, 359 (1986).
24. Douglas Hay, Controlling the English Prosecutor, 21 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 165, 167
(1983).
25. Prosecution of Offences Act, 1879, 42 & 43 Vict. c. 22 (Eng.).
26. Would the Ends of Justice Be Promoted by the Appointment of a Public Prosecutor?,
4 PHILOMATHIC J. & LITERARY REV. 309, 345 (1826).
27. Cardenas, supra note 23, at 368; William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial
Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 653
(1976).
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and the chaos created by laws giving rewards for successful prosecution led
to criticism of private prosecution and calls for a public alternative.28 Critics
of private prosecution emphasized that the system introduced problems,
as crime victims and their paid advocates sought unfair financial benefit.29
By the American Revolution, many colonies had moved toward partial
public prosecution.30
Proponents of public prosecution in nineteenth-century America
emphasized how the private model vindicated the private interests of
parties at the public expense. Increasingly, the prosecutor came to be
viewed as a fiduciary of the public at large or of the public interest in the
abstract, not as an agent of an individual victim. There was a practical
significance to the shift. When the defendant’s guilt was uncertain, a
private lawyer might vigorously prosecute out of fidelity to the victimclient if not as a matter of self-interest, whereas a public prosecutor
would be expected to refrain from doing so to avoid convicting an
innocent person. In 1888, recognizing this concern, a Wisconsin court
declared private prosecution unconstitutional, explaining, “[t]he
prosecuting officer represents the public interests, which can never be
promoted by the conviction of the innocent. His object, like that of the
court, should be simply justice; and he has no right to sacrifice this to
the pride of professional success.”31 Another court explicitly described
the prosecutor’s role as a “public trust, committed by the public to an
individual.”32

28. Cardenas, supra note 23, at 368–69.
29. Id. at 369.
30. Id. at 371.
31. Biemel v. State, 37 N.W. 244, 247 (Wis. 1888); see also Meister v. People, 31 Mich.
99, 103–04 (1875) (arguing that prosecutors owe a “[d]uty of impartiality” that is
inconsistent with the privately funded prosecution).
32. State ex rel. Gibson v. Friedley, 34 N.E. 872, 875 (Ind. 1893); see also State ex rel.
Black v. Taylor, 106 S.W. 1023, 1027 (Mo. 1907) (refusing to allow the Attorney General
to “farm out” his obligations to private parties because prosecution is a “public trust”);
People ex rel. Peabody v. Attorney General, 13 How. Pr. 179, 183 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856)
(refusing to grant a writ of mandamus forcing the Attorney General to bring an action
on the application of a private party and stating: “Our legislature have seen fit to invest
the attorney general with this discretion. His office is a public trust. It is a legal
presumption that he will do his duty—that he will act with strict impartiality. In this
confidence he has been endowed with a large discretion, not only in cases like this, but
in other matters of public concern. The exercise of such discretion is, in its nature, a
judicial act, from which there is no appeal, and over which courts have no control”);
Commonwealth v. Burrell, 7 Pa. 34, 39 (Sup. Ct. 1847) (“[T]he office of the attorneygeneral is a public trust . . . .”).
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Likewise, one of the founders of modern legal ethics, George
Sharswood, conceptualized prosecutors as public trustees—that is, as
fiduciaries of the general public. In 1869, he wrote:
There is no obligation on an attorney to minister to the bad passions
of his client; it is but rarely that a criminal prosecution is pursued for
a valuable private end, the restoration of goods, the maintenance of
the good name of the prosecutor, or closing the mouth of a man who
has perjured himself in a court of justice. The office of the AttorneyGeneral is a public trust, which involves in the discharge of it, the
exertion of an almost boundless discretion, by an officer who stands
as impartial as a judge.33

While analogizing prosecutors to judges in their obligation of impartiality,
Sharswood did not otherwise specify prosecutors’ fiduciary obligations as
holders of the public trust.
It would be an overstatement to suggest that the private service
model of prosecution was entirely supplanted. Private prosecution
persisted for quite some time in the United States, and remnants of it
still exist.34 Meanwhile, early concerns about the dangers of political
control of prosecution expressed by proponents of private prosecution
subsided but did not abate.
At the end of the nineteenth century, professionalism emerged as a
way to address concerns that prosecutors would use the state’s criminal
justice authority to promote narrow parochial or partisan interests.35
Prosecutors, as professionals, would be constrained by ethical norms,
experience, and training not only in their actions but also in the process
by which they make decisions.36 Just as judges draw on judicial norms,
such as those governing the interpretation of statutes and application of
precedent, prosecutors too look to evolving written and unwritten
prosecutorial traditions.37 These contemporary understandings are
consistent with the idea of the prosecutor as a fiduciary who exercises
discretion on behalf of others who are vulnerable and dependent. This
understanding also offers a rationale for subjecting prosecutors to
33. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 95 (3d ed. 1869).
34. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private
Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 413–15 (2009).
35. Green & Roiphe, supra note 15, at 49–55.
36. Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Political Theory and Legitimacy, in
FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT, supra note 22, at 163, 165–66 (arguing that what distinguishes
legitimate fiduciary relationships is limits on the fiduciary’s cognitive function).
37. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Accountability, 2004 Wis.
L. Rev. 837, 870–83 (describing prosecutors’ decisions making based on principles
derived from legislation, the purposes of criminal law, and elsewhere).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3529379

2020]

A FIDUCIARY THEORY OF PROSECUTION

113

normative constraints intended to minimize the risk of self-dealing and
other abuses of discretion.
B. Theoretical Background
The theory of fiduciary governance has drawn on the private law and
theory of fiduciaries to develop an understanding of the role and
responsibilities of public officials, including judges.38 As lawyers
appearing in court on behalf of a client, prosecutors are fiduciaries in
the most classical sense. But like other public officials, prosecutors are
also a different sort of fiduciary. Instead of serving a defined interest of
a particular beneficiary, this fiduciary administers the law on the
public’s behalf in furtherance of an abstract public purpose.39 In
deciding whether to initiate an investigation or criminal charge, to plea
bargain or to dismiss a prosecution, prosecutors do not take direction
from clients or defer to clients’ objectives. Nor do they engage in
ministerial acts. They exercise discretion as other public officials,
particularly judges, do.
The fiduciary relationship is defined as one involving discretionary
power and structural vulnerability.40 Trustees, for instance, exercise a
great deal of discretionary power over the beneficiary, who, as a result,
is vulnerable to abuse. A hallmark of the relationship is trust, and
monitoring costs are usually high.41 Prosecutors fit this mold. Scholars
and critics have pointed out both prosecutors’ vast discretion and the
very real potential for abuse at the expense of the public.42
Arguments that judges are fiduciaries are largely applicable to
prosecutors as well.43 Prosecutors have been described as quasi-judicial

38. See Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 567–70.
39. In this role prosecutors are involved in administration for abstract purposes
rather than for an individual or set of individuals. Id. at 523. Miller and Gold put it this
way: “A fiduciary relationship is one in which one person (the fiduciary) enjoys
discretionary power to pursue an abstract other-regarding purpose . . . of another
person (an individual beneficiary or ascertained set of beneficiaries).” Id. at 549.
40. Miller, supra note 1, at 69–75.
41. Leib et al., supra note 2, at 706.
42. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 4, at 961 (“Prosecutors have great leeway to abuse
their powers and indulge their self-interests, biases, or arbitrariness.”); Davis, supra
note 4, at 408–16 (surveying “prosecutorial discretion and how it is abused”); Bruce A.
Green, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Difficulty and Necessity of Public Inquiry, 123 DICK. L.
REV. 589, 606–18 (2019) (discussing why prosecutorial abuse of discretion is hard to
define and detect).
43. See Leib et al., supra note 2 (applying fiduciary principles in public law to the
judiciary).
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officials—“minister[s] of justice.”44 In exercising discretion in the criminal
context, prosecutors both determine the relevant public interests and decide
how to balance and pursue them in particular factual circumstances. In other
words, their role is constitutive in defining the abstract interest they are
supposed to serve and instrumental in furthering it in particular cases.
Prosecutors do not have a traditional beneficiary who defines the objectives
of the fiduciary relationship. They discern, and contribute to developing, the
collective understanding of justice as they implement it in any given case.
It is almost universally recognized that U.S. prosecutors’ duty is to “seek
justice.”45 But in concrete cases, it is a challenge to give substance and
meaning to this vague mandate.46 To some extent, the law establishes
the outer limits of this obligation by, among other things, restricting how
prosecutors acquire evidence, prescribing the minimum amount of
information they must disclose to the defense, and precluding certain

44. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an
advocate.”). See generally Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91
N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 833 (2016) (contrasting “punishment-maximizing” prosecution with
“an idealized vision of the prosecutor as minister of justice”); Eric S. Fish, Against
Adversary Prosecution, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1419, 1463–68 (2018) (describing the
significance of conceptualizing prosecutors as “minister[s] of justice”).
45. For a description and explanation for why prosecutors have a duty to seek
justice, see Green, supra note 9, at 633–37.
46. See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 9, at 11 (arguing that the duty to “advocate for justice”
is too vague to give prosecutors meaningful guidance, and that greater guidance is
provided by conceptualizing prosecutors as “servant[s] of the law”); Bibas, supra note 4,
at 961 (“In theory, prosecutors are beholden to the public interest or justice. These
concepts, however, are so diffuse and elastic that they do not constrain prosecutors
much, certainly not in the way that an identifiable client would.”). Others see
prosecutors’ “duty to seek justice” as a useful starting point for ascertaining prosecutors’
particular obligations. See, e.g., Fish, supra note 9, at 305 (“In the many situations where
judges are unable to fully implement constitutional protections, prosecutors should step
in and perform the task themselves. The theoretical resources for this role can be found
in commonplace maxims about prosecutors: they have a duty to ‘seek justice,’ not just
obtain convictions, and they are obligated to uphold the Constitution through their oaths
of office.”); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 46 (1991) (arguing that prosecutors’ duty to
do justice implies specific obligations to compensate for the inadequacies of the
adversarial process); see also Lissa Griffin & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ministers of Justice and
Mass Incarceration, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 301 (2017) (arguing for changes within the
prosecutorial system to better balance prosecutors’ roles as ministers of justice and
advocates in light of prosecutors’ contribution to mass incarceration); K. Babe Howell,
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened Criminal Justice
System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285 (2014).
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jury arguments.47 But within the confines of the law, prosecutors have vast
discretion. Some guidance may be implicit in the law.48 Professional
tradition or consensus and office policies may also work to fill in the gaps.
But prosecutors interpret this guidance differently and take vastly
divergent approaches to discretionary decision making. Identifying the
prosecutor as a public fiduciary suggests that the diversity of approaches
may not be a problem as long as prosecutors follow a set process for
deliberately and consciously discerning and pursuing the interests of the
beneficiary.
This raises the question of who or what is the prosecutor’s beneficiary?
Fiduciary theorists have sought to define the beneficiary of judges,49 the
legislature,50 and administrative agencies.51 We know who the prosecutor’s
client is—the public entity named in the caption of the criminal indictment
(the United States, the State, the Commonwealth, the People of the State, etc.).
Is the beneficiary the entire public in the abstract sense or some segment of
the public? If so, is there a tension between the prosecutor’s fiduciary duties
as a lawyer and the prosecutor’s fiduciary duties as a public official? Does the
prosecutor owe particularly strong obligations to some subgroup of the
public, like the victim, or even the accused? While the prosecutor’s
beneficiary is the public, the public’s objective in the criminal context is to
render or achieve justice; hence, the prosecutor’s duty as a fiduciary is to
pursue the public’s abstract interest in justice, which entails a constellation
of interests and values.
Prosecutors and other public officials balance competing concerns of
a complex group, but they also balance the interests of the public with
the needs of the state and the proper functioning of the criminal justice
system. As Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent have argued, both public
fiduciaries and private fiduciaries are required to engage in a careful
balancing of competing interests. Tensions arise both among a group of

47. See Fish, supra note 9, at 275–78 (describing ABA Model Rule 3.8 and state
model rule equivalents that impose requirements on prosecutors). See generally Green
& Zacharias, supra note 14 (detailing the various ethical rules implemented on the state
and federal level, along with other prosecutorial accountability mechanisms).
48. See Bellin, supra note 9, at 49–51.
49. E.g., Leib et al., supra note 2 (applying fiduciary principles to the judiciary to
analyze the role of judges in democracy).
50. E.g., D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 676
(2013) (arguing that courts should apply a fiduciary duty of loyalty to political
representatives to hold them accountable for political gerrymandering).
51. Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in
Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 466–68 (2010).
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beneficiaries and between the beneficiary and the state.52 A prosecutor,
like other fiduciaries, could be seen as owing first order obligations to
the public and a separate second order fiduciary obligation to the courts
and criminal justice system. Alternatively, the prosecutor’s obligation to
the public, courts, and the criminal justice system could all derive from
the fiduciary obligation to the public. In either iteration, fiduciary
obligation shifts from loyalty to a duty of fairness and reasonableness in
this context. The prosecutor must be fair in assessing the interest of the
beneficiary and in balancing competing priorities and values. Values
embraced by some members of the public might overlap with the
interests of the state in a properly functioning criminal justice system,
while others may not. Prosecutors’ duties to fairly consider the interests
of the public as a whole may involve at least offering reasons for
prioritizing some criminal justice ends over others. Again, prosecutorial
independence from powerful majorities is crucial to preserve this
discretionary balancing.
Drawing on fiduciary theory, this Article argues that the prosecutor’s
obligation is to pursue the public’s abstract and evolving interest in
justice. Other public officials may have a more defined mandate.
Administrative agencies, for instance, usually have a particular mission.
For example, the Federal Election Commission is tasked with enforcing
and administering the federal election laws.53 The prosecutor’s mandate,
in contrast, is vague and subject to multiple conflicting interpretations.
Even so, as fiduciaries, prosecutors are required to continually take part
in an ongoing process of exposition. This exposition ought to take place
according to the traditions and policies of the prosecutor’s office. Like the
limits of permissible judicial reasoning, these practices will limit
discretion and confine the process in a way that ought to reassure us that
we are not simply subject to any one prosecutor’s idiosyncratic view of
justice. At any given moment, there will be competing understandings,
but if prosecutors engage in a deliberate and transparent process of
seeking to define justice in a consistent and rational way within the
context of the traditions, policies, and practices of the office, that
abstract ideal will gain meaning, and hopefully some consensus, through
practice over time.

52. Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, Guardians of Legal Order: The Dual
Commissions of Public Fiduciaries, in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT, supra note 22, at 67.
53. Mission and History, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/about/ missionand-history [https://perma.cc/EQ67-JVT3].
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One difference between prosecutors’ objective and the abstract
objectives pursued by most other fiduciaries is that justice is
exceedingly vague. In a donative trust or a corporation, the trustee’s
mission may be a group goal, like the goal of profit maximization in the
corporate context, but it is defined. Without such specifically designed
purpose, one may wonder whether prosecutors are doing anything
other than indulging their own personal views and priorities. In the
context of prosecution, what gives justice meaning beyond the personal
view of the prosecutor is developed traditions and practices of
prosecutors’ offices. Monitoring and accountability, therefore, must
focus on the effectiveness of these norms and practices.
If we define prosecutors’ objectives in this way, what then are the
duties of care and loyalty in the context of a criminal prosecution? In the
private fiduciary context, where there is a discernable beneficiary or
group of beneficiaries, loyalty can denote obedience to the beneficiary, or
it can mean pursuing the best interest of the beneficiary even if the
beneficiary prefers a different course,54 but, at the very least, it means
avoiding opportunism and eschewing the interests of third parties. Unlike
an ordinary fiduciary for a private party, but like other public officials, the
prosecutor does not exercise discretion for the benefit of a person or even
a group of people who can give guidance or direction.
If we conceive of the prosecutor’s objective as the abstract public
interest in justice, it becomes clear that prosecutors ought not operate
with conflicts of interest that threaten to warp disinterested decision
making on behalf of the public. We have argued previously that the
absence of such conflicts is the key to proper prosecutorial conduct.55
But even if they avoid conflicts of interest, how do prosecutors give
content to these duties when the law is not explicit and decisions are
entrusted to their discretion? Do the duties of care and loyalty add
anything to the duties identified with prosecutors’ role as ministers of
justice, and, if so, are these duties in tension?
This concept of the fiduciary obligation of prosecutors helps to clarify the
complex relationship between independence and accountability. As Paul
Miller and Andrew Gold explain, a public official is not policed by the
beneficiary (the public), but, if at all, by individuals and institutions who, as
co-fiduciaries, are assigned a monitoring role.56 In fact, there is reason to
54. Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 558–59.
55. See generally Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts
of Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV. 463 (2017).
56. Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 555.
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maintain distance from direct popular control because prosecutors ought
not define justice by the interest of the collectivity or any subset of the
collectivity at any given time. Instead, they ought to build on past
understandings. In this way, the abstract purpose, like the common law, is
evolving and changing with time.57
For prosecutors, however, these co-fiduciary monitors are few and
weak. The gap in monitoring is necessary because prosecutors must be
afforded independence from both political influence and popular
control to pursue even-handed justice. But given this absence of
external control, prosecutors must be held accountable in a different
way. Rather than imagining public officials entering into a kind of
contract with citizens, fiduciary theory helps highlight the need for
disinterested decision making by public officials and the attendant need
to avoid conflicts of interest that might compromise that neutral
approach.58 It further pushes us to recognize the need for mechanisms
of accountability that acknowledge the complexity of a fiduciary
relationship when the beneficiary is an abstraction (the public), not a
defined individual or group of individuals, and the beneficiary’s
principal objective is an idea (justice) that is a distillation of interests
shared by the public over time. The best form of accountability in this
context may be institutional in the following sense: prosecutors’ offices
must maintain required, transparent, and deliberate processes and
procedures for decision making. Prosecutors need not be transparent
about individual deliberations. But they must be transparent about
prosecutors’ compliance with these procedures and how the various
mechanisms within their offices work to align prosecutors’
deliberations with the abstract public interest in justice.59
The virtually unbridled power in prosecutors’ offices is troubling. The
internal structure of these offices ought to be altered to improve
monitoring without compromising independence too seriously. That
said, imperfect monitoring is an inevitable condition of public

57. Id. at 526. Some have criticized the idea that judges are fiduciaries for abstract
interests like the law. See Leib et al., supra note 2, at 702–03 & n.16. But this seems more
apt when it comes to prosecutors. The public interest in justice has to be defined over
time and with reference to prosecutors’ work, including the errors and misconduct that
has been exposed.
58. Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 557–58 & n.132.
59. These mechanisms should work to ensure that the goal of justice and the
definition of that goal persists over time despite the change in the makeup of the
citizenry. How we understand justice may evolve, but it may not be radically displaced
because one set of citizens so chooses. Id. at 525.
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fiduciaries.60 The character of the fiduciary, the integrity of the public
official, is also critical to a well-functioning relationship.61 Therefore,
reforms should focus not only on transparency and processes, but also
on improving culture and education to ensure that those who wield this
sort of power use it prudently.
II. PROSECUTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Prosecutors’ fiduciary role is complex. As a public official, the
prosecutor, on behalf of the public, has authority to identify general policy
objectives in criminal justice and to decide how to pursue these objectives
in any individual case, including when, as is typically true, these objectives
are at cross-purposes.62 As a lawyer in the adversary process, a prosecutor
serves a more conventional fiduciary role. Within the bounds of judicial
procedure and other law, advocates ordinarily strive to accomplish the
objectives identified by their clients. In doing so, advocates exercise some
discretion to decide how best to accomplish the client’s objectives while
acting within the law. But even as an advocate, the prosecutor’s fiduciary
obligations are complex because the objectives to be pursued on behalf of
the public—the varying objectives that together comprise “justice”—are
often themselves amorphous, and because, while the prosecutor is
advocating for the public’s objectives in a criminal case, the prosecutor as a
public official is trying to ascertain those objectives, which may shift or
evolve.
In both roles, prosecutors owe the public fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty—the two core duties that fiduciaries owe their principals. In general,
these concepts have been underemphasized and underdeveloped in the
literature on prosecutors’ role and regulation. The literature addresses both
prosecutors’ adversarial role, including prosecutors’ legal obligations to
the defendant and to the court and prosecutors’ exercise of discretion
on behalf of the public writ large.63 But scholars rarely identify care and
loyalty as touchstones for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Intuitively, prosecutors’ duty of care or loyalty to the public may seem
insignificant since prosecutors have no identifiable client complaining
of being disserved or betrayed. Nonetheless, the fiduciary duties of care
60. Leib et al., supra note 2, at 708.
61. Id. at 712.
62. Green & Roiphe, supra note 55, at 471.
63. See, e.g., Fish, supra note 9, at 244–48 (describing prosecutors’ position in the
criminal justice system both as adversarial and quasi-judicial); Sklansky, supra note 3
(arguing that prosecutors are “mediating figures” who must balance between “law and
discretion”).
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and loyalty help explain how prosecutors ought to exercise discretion,
particularly with regard to the crucial questions of whether to bring
charges and which charges to pursue. Emphasizing the prosecutor’s
fiduciary role may not provide concrete answers in individual cases, but, as
this Part shows, it has implications for how prosecutors exercise discretion
from both normative and procedural perspectives. The complexities of
prosecutors’ fiduciary role add to the importance of developing mechanisms
of accountability.
A. Prosecutors’ Duty of Care and Competence
Prosecutors have a duty of care both as public officials and as advocates.
As public officials defining the objectives of an investigation or prosecution,
prosecutors have broad discretion like that of other executive branch
officials in higher office, but they must exercise that discretion in light of the
public interest.64 Prosecutors must also exercise care as advocates—for
example, in selecting investigative techniques, in preparing for trial, in
selecting legal theories and making legal arguments, in negotiating pleas, in
complying with discovery obligations and other legal obligations, and so
on—in light of the public objectives they have identified.65 One might expect
that, at least in the advocacy role, prosecutors would be subject to the same
accountability mechanisms as lawyers for private clients, who may be
disciplined or civilly liable when their professional work is so substandard that
it violates the duty of care.66 But even here, conventional accountability
mechanisms are likely less effective. With an eye toward preserving
prosecutorial independence, both the law and legal institutions (i.e.,
disciplinary authorities and courts) largely insulate prosecutors from
external monitoring.67
For prosecutors, one potential monitor is the lawyer disciplinary agency
of the jurisdiction where the prosecutor is licensed. But discipline has
historically been ineffective in enforcing prosecutors’ duty of care.68 All
64. Green & Roiphe, supra note 55, at 470.
65. Bruce A. Green, Urban Policing and Public Policy—The Prosecutor’s Role, 51 GA.
L. REV. 1179 , 1189–90 (2017).
66. Susan R. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69
GEO. L.J. 705, 708–11 (1981).
67. Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
873, 874–75 (2012).
68. See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful
Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 16
(2009) (“In theory, prosecutors are subject to the . . . obligation to ‘provide competent
representation to a client’” under state disciplinary rules based on Model Rule 1.1, but
“[a]s a practical matter, disciplinary regulators have not implemented rules like Model
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lawyers are subject to a disciplinary duty of competence, which is enforced
selectively within the lawyer disciplinary process, typically in response to
complaints by disgruntled clients who can show extreme or systematic
neglect.69 Prosecutors, however, have no clients who can lodge complaints
with the disciplinary authorities, and complaints by criminal defendants
and their lawyers asserting that prosecutors were careless may not be
taken seriously. Disciplinary authorities will take judges’ complaints more
seriously. In other words, discipline of prosecutors for incompetence—
which, in practice, is exceedingly rare—will be limited to situations where
courts are aggrieved by prosecutors’ carelessness.70
Nor does civil litigation provide a meaningful oversight role for
prosecutors. Unlike lawyers representing private clients, prosecutors have
no aggrieved clients who might bring a malpractice or breach of fiduciary
duty claim when a prosecutor performs carelessly. Criminal defendants
who are injured by prosecutors’ legal violations have a very limited right to
bring civil claims,71 but not claims predicated on mere negligence.72
Judges generally have authority to remedy and sanction lawyers’
wrongdoing in the cases over which the judges preside,73 but when
prosecutors violate the law through carelessness, courts are limited in their
ability to hold prosecutors accountable. In some cases, they can provide
juridical redress, which may be accompanied by public criticism of the
prosecutor.74 This sort of shaming may serve as an accountability
Rule 1.1 against prosecutors. Prosecutorial neglect has been regulated almost
exclusively through internal administrative sanctions or informally by courts.”).
69. See generally Martyn, supra note 66, at 712.
70. For a rare example, see Livingston v. Va. State Bar, 744 S.E.2d 220, 224–25 (Va.
2013) (upholding discipline of prosecutor for negligently filing a succession of defective
indictments).
71. Prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for conduct in their
advocacy role, and they have qualified immunity for investigative or administrative
work. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427–31 (1976). For critiques of prosecutors’
absolute immunity, see Randall Grometstein & Jennifer M. Balboni, Backing Out of a
Constitutional Ditch: Constitutional Remedies for Gross Prosecutorial Misconduct Post
Thompson, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1243, 1268–69 (2012); Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering
Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV. 53, 106–07.
72. See, e.g., McGhee v. Pottawattamee Cty., 475 F. Supp. 2d 862, 909 (S.D. Iowa
2007) (stating that “mere negligence” is never sufficient to overcome qualified
immunity).
73. See United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1182–86 (2d Cir. 1981) (reviewing
remedies and sanctions available to trial and appellate courts for prosecutors’ improper
closing statements).
74. See, e.g., People v. Velasco-Palacios, 235 Cal. App. 4th 439, 447 (Ct. App. 2015)
(upholding dismissal of indictment as sanction for prosecutor’s fabrication of evidence
during plea negotiations).
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mechanism.75 But courts’ remedial role is an indirect and weak means of
accountability and one that many consider inadequate.76 Courts also have
authority to sanction individual prosecutors who violate the law, but they are
unlikely to do so where the violation is unintentional.77 Ultimately, courts play
a limited role in elaborating and enforcing a standard of prosecutorial care, and
virtually no role where the lack of care relates to prosecutors’ exercise of
discretion rather than to their compliance with the law.78
The lack of meaningful legal accountability inhibits the development of
understandings about what it means for prosecutors to perform their work
with care. Courts do not help define the objectives that prosecutors are
supposed to serve, whether in general or in any given case; nor do they
determine how prosecutors are supposed to achieve those objectives other
than to hold prosecutors accountable when they break the law. Other
lawyers look to their peers to determine the standard of care because
they are potentially subject to civil liability for negligence when their work
falls below expectations of other lawyers in the legal community performing
similar work.79 But no analogous legal mechanism encourages prosecutors
to compare their work with that of other lawyers.
This may not seem to be a serious problem when it comes to
prosecutors’ work as advocates. In a criminal case, one might think that
the prosecution’s objectives are obvious—for example, to secure a guilty
verdict at trial or to secure a guilty plea—and one might measure the
quality of prosecutors’ work by its likelihood of achieving these
75. See generally Lara Bazelon, For Shame: The Public Humiliation of Prosecutors by
Judges to Correct Wrongful Convictions, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 305, 313 (2016).
76. See, e.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, Accountability,
and a Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 83–84 (2013) (maintaining that there is
“little incentive for offending prosecutors to refrain from future misconduct” when a
judicial remedy is afforded but no personal sanction is imposed for prosecutorial
misconduct beyond perhaps “a verbal reprimand”).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 686 F. Supp. 2d 147, 148, 152–53 (D. Mass. 2010)
(declining to sanction prosecutor for an “egregious error” in failing to disclose “plainly
important exculpatory information” because she was contrite and subsequently
educated herself regarding her disclosure obligations).
78. See Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as
a Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143, 166–77 (2016) (reviewing small number of cases in which
prosecutors have been disciplined for misconduct relating to their charging and plea
bargaining decisions).
79. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Price, 514 N.E.2d 127, 136 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (“[A] claim
of legal malpractice [is] based on an alleged failure to exercise the knowledge, skill and
ability ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the legal profession similarly
situated . . . .”).
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objectives. Further, prosecutors’ advocacy appears relatively similar to
that of other lawyers’ advocacy, and therefore, the analogous work of
other advocates may establish a relevant standard. But prosecutors’
advocacy role is in fact distinctive, and it poses challenges because, at
the same time that prosecutors may be striving to secure a conviction, they
may have other, potentially countervailing, objectives, such as to avoid a
wrongful conviction and to ensure the defense a fair (not merely lawful)
process. Given these further objectives, some argue that prosecutors fail to
exercise adequate care when, although acting lawfully, they use unreliable
evidence, ignore or exploit defense lawyers’ substandard work, or withhold
information that would be useful to the defense.80
The challenge of giving meaning to prosecutors’ duty of care is even
more complicated because prosecutors serve as public officials, making
discretionary judgments such as whether to investigate, whether to
bring or drop charges, or whether to plea bargain. One cannot measure
the competence of these decisions by assessing how well they achieve
the prosecution’s objectives because this is the process by which
prosecutors define their objectives. Discretionary decisions involve
multiple and complex considerations. Further, these are the kinds of
decisions that clients ordinarily make in a lawyer-client relationship.
Therefore, one cannot look to the ordinary work of trial advocates
representing private clients to measure whether prosecutors’
discretionary judgments are or are not competent.
Nor, for the most part, can one look to judicial decisions and
pronouncements for a standard governing the competence of prosecutors’
discretionary decision making. The very premise of prosecutorial
discretion is that, when exercised within the law, it is not susceptible to
judicial review despite the “potential for both individual and institutional
abuse.”81 Even if ninety-nine out of 100 prosecutors would decline to bring
charges in a case because the defendant’s guilt is too doubtful and the
likelihood of a conviction is too low, as long as the prosecutor meets the

80. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Access to Criminal Justice: Where Are the Prosecutors?, 3
TEX. A&M L. REV. 515, 526–27 (2016) (discussing a prosecutor who, in exploiting
unreliable evidence, failed to “take reasonable steps to avoid convicting [an] innocent
[person]”).
81. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978). Indeed, even when exercised
in an unconstitutionally arbitrary fashion, prosecutors’ discretionary decisions may
escape judicial review. United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir.
1992) (“Our only available course is to deny the defendant a judicial remedy for what
may be a violation of a constitutional right—not to have charging or plea bargaining
decisions made in an arbitrary or capricious manner.”).
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minimum legal standard of “probable cause,” a court will rarely interfere
with the prosecutor’s judgment either through the adjudicative process
or through the disciplinary process.82 To say that the court cannot
overturn the prosecutor’s decision is not to say that the prosecutor
exercised prosecutorial authority competently. On the contrary, ninetynine out of 100 prosecutors, and 100% of judges, may privately regard
the decision as an egregious abuse of discretion. But the point is that
there is no legal process for developing and accumulating legal
decisions, as there is for private clients, to express the prevailing
normative understanding.
Because the quality of prosecutors’ discretionary decision making is
not subject to meaningful legal review, other mechanisms are needed to
establish and enforce norms of prosecutorial competence. Prosecutors
might look to their peers within their office, or to other prosecutors’
offices, to ascertain expectations. In general, the former is more likely
than the latter.83 The organized bar has developed norms of
prosecutorial conduct, including those governing discretionary decision
making.84 But, in part because of prosecutors’ influence, the bar’s
writings provide limited guidance. And because prosecutors regard the
organized bar as subject to capture by defense lawyers, they may ignore
these writings.85
As for prosecutors’ accountability for upholding the duty of care, in
the absence of legal enforcement mechanisms, a heavy burden is placed
82. See Green & Levine, supra note 78, at 164–65 (discussing the rarity of judicial
review of prosecutorial charging discretion). Recently, courts have been scrutinizing
decisions by progressive prosecutors not to charge in entire categories of cases. See e.g.,
Justin Jouvenal & Rachel Weiner, Prosecutors Won’t Pursue Marijuana Possession Charges
in Two Northern Virginia Counties, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2020).
83. See Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Ethics in Context: Influences
on Prosecutorial Disclosure, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT
269, 279 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) (“Prosecutors’ offices are something
of an exception [to offices’ tendency to converge on a single way of working], partly
because of their highly localized character. Since they are not directly in competition for
business, the homogenizing pressures are much weaker. They do not adopt similar
policies [regarding disclosures to the defense].”).
84. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION STANDARD 3–4.4
(AM. BAR ASS’N, 4th ed. 2018) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION]
(addressing “Discretion in Filing, Declining, Maintaining, and Dismissing Criminal
Charges”).
85. See Green, supra note 67, at 898 (“Even if professional conduct rules might
legitimately regulate them, prosecutors suggest, the existing process for developing
professional conduct rules is illegitimate because of the influence of bar associations,
which are subject to capture by criminal defense interests.”).
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on prosecutors to regulate themselves, which is to say that we rely on
their professional commitment to standards of care as they have come
to understand them. Internal self-regulation by a prosecutor’s office
may be the most meaningful mechanism to ensure the accountability of
subordinate prosecutors.86 The elected prosecutor, or chief appointed
prosecutor, has a stake in the quality of the office’s work and can
therefore be expected to police both advocacy and discretionary
decision making by subordinate lawyers. But at the same time, a chief
prosecutor who makes discretionary decisions badly cannot be
expected to enforce a high standard of care but, on the contrary, is likely
to influence subordinates to make their own decisions just as badly.
B. Prosecutors’ Duty of Loyalty
Like other fiduciaries, prosecutors have a fiduciary duty of loyalty. As
lawyers for the public, their loyalty duty may seem comparable to that
of a lawyer for a private entity. Unlike many fiduciaries for private
beneficiaries, such as lawyers for private entities who can take direction
from duly authorized representatives of the entity-client, prosecutors
are the public officials who make decisions for the public entity-client.
In this role, too, prosecutors are fiduciaries.
In criminal cases, there may be several threats to disinterested
prosecutorial decision making. One risk is that prosecutors will act in
their own self-interest at the expense of the public interest—a variation
of what Thomas Rave calls the principal-agent problem.87 Another is that
prosecutors will serve the private interests or preferences of identifiable
third parties.88 Although these concerns apply equally to prosecutors’ role
as lawyers and as public officials, a third risk relates uniquely to
prosecutors’ governance role. In the context of governance, loyalty
generally means serving the broader purpose or goal of a community.89
The risk is that the prosecutor will be influenced by a sub-group’s wellarticulated interest at the expense of the broader public interest.90 Rave
86. See generally Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1971); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing
Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010,
1028 (2005).
87. D. Theodore Rave, Two Problems of Fiduciary Governance, in FIDUCIARY
GOVERNMENT, supra note 22, at 49, 49–50.
88. Id.
89. See Leib et al., supra note 2, at 731.
90. Id. at 712.
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calls this risk—that a powerful sub-group within the group that
comprises the beneficiary can dominate at the expense of the others—
the tyranny-of-the-majority problem.91 The ordinary problem of
subgroup dominance is compounded in the case of prosecutors once we
conceive of the beneficiary’s objective as the public interest in justice,
the meaning of which develops over time by accretion in common law
fashion. Given that this objective is so vague and subject to
interpretation, there is a heightened risk that a subgroup’s exercise of
undue influence will be indiscernible.92
Scholars and courts assume that prosecutors must serve the public
and, at a minimum, avoid conflicts of interest.93 To some extent, this
expectation is codified in the law and enforced by legal institutions.94
Unlike lawyers for private clients, prosecutors are not subject to civil
lawsuits for breach of loyalty. But courts require prosecutors to adhere

91. Rave, supra note 87, at 49–66.
92. In general, it is hard to prove and defend against improper influence on
prosecutorial decision making because the process is so opaque. For example, the
Manhattan District Attorney recently disputed claims that criminal defense lawyers’
campaign contributions influenced the prosecutors’ decision not to pursue charges
against their clients, leading to a prosecutors’ reexamination of campaign finance
practices. See Elizabeth Holtzman & David Yassky, The Lessons of Cyrus Vance’s
Campaign
Contributions,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
6,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/
06/opinion/cyrus-vance-contributionsweinstein.html; see also CTR. FOR ADVANCEMENT OF PUB. INTEGRITY, RAISING THE BAR: REDUCING
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND INCREASING TRANSPARENCY IN DISTRICT ATTORNEY CAMPAIGN
FUNDRAISING
18
(2018),
https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/publicintegrity/raising_the_bar.pdf [https://perma.cc/UXG8-4FHE].
Questions might also be raised about whether, and when, subgroup influence may be
appropriate. For example, prosecutors are obviously subject to the influence of the
police or other investigative agents. See generally Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of
Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 191–94 (2019) (describing police influence on
criminal justice decisions); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and
Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 771–72 (2003). Ordinarily, investigators’
influence over charging and plea bargaining decisions may seem unremarkable. But
their influence may be problematic, for example, in cases where the propriety of police
or investigative conduct is in issue.
93. See, e.g., In re Cole, 738 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 (Ind. 2000) (finding that the
prosecutor “served a public trust to enforce the law” and “[t]he state is entitled to a
prosecutor’s undivided loyalty”); see also STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
STANDARDS, supra note 84, at STANDARD 3–1.3 (“The prosecutor generally serves the public
and not any particular government agency, law enforcement officer or unit, witness or
victim.”); id. STANDARD 3–1.7 (addressing prosecutors’ conflicts of interest).
94. See generally Green & Roiphe, supra note 55, at 469, 471.
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to the conflict of interest rules that govern lawyers generally.95
Constitutional decisions recognize prosecutors’ obligation to be
disinterested, which is another way of enforcing a duty of loyalty.96 Judges
exercise statutory or inherent authority to disqualify prosecutors, and
prosecutors recuse themselves, in some situations where there is a serious
risk that prosecutors will inappropriately serve private interests.97
Interestingly, the conflict of interest law seeks to preserve disinterestedness
in prosecutors’ role as public officials exercising prosecutorial discretion no
less than in their role as courtroom advocates.98
While incomplete and imperfect, conflicts of interest standards help
to ensure against the danger that prosecutors will seek to advance their
own personal interests instead of that of the public. Conflict of interest
rules are most likely to apply when a particular prosecutor is at risk of
engaging in self-dealing because the particular prosecutor has a unique and
tangible self-interest.99 For example, a prosecutor who has a financial stake
in a corporation would not be expected to make prosecutorial decisions
regarding the corporation. And a prosecutor who is a victim of a crime
would not be expected to prosecute the perpetrator.
Prosecutors’ obligation to refrain from acting self-interestedly poses
some interesting challenges, however, when the prosecutor’s interests
are intangible, particularly when it comes to the pervasive and
unavoidable self-interest in one’s own reputation and career
advancement.100 Prosecutors almost always stand to benefit
95. Id. at 484–88 & n.104 (citing examples).
96. Id. at 488–91.
97. Id. at 491–99.
98. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 807 (1987)
(“[T]he fact that the judge makes the initial decision that a contempt prosecution should
proceed is not sufficient to quell concern that prosecution by an interested party may be
influenced by improper motives. A prosecutor exercises considerable discretion in
matters such as the determination of which persons should be targets of investigation,
what methods of investigation should be used, what information will be sought as
evidence, which persons should be charged with what offenses, which persons should
be utilized as witnesses, whether to enter into plea bargains and the terms on which
they will be established, and whether any individuals should be granted immunity.
These decisions, critical to the conduct of a prosecution, are all made outside the
supervision of the court.”).
99. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 55, at 472 (discussing “personal-interest
conflicts [that] relate to a particular prosecutor in an idiosyncratic way”).
100. See id. at 480–81 (“Even prosecutors who do not seek professional advancement
are jealous of their professional reputation. This broad self-interest can come into play
in every criminal case in ways that are inconsistent with the expectations of
disinterested prosecution.”).
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professionally if they conduct their work in a manner that seems adept
or successful from the view of their supervisors or others. This could
theoretically provide motivation to carry out the fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care, but is often charged that prosecutors are simply
looking to put notches on their belts, at the expense of the public interest
in “doing justice.”101 Prosecutors cannot, however, recuse themselves
from cases where their professional self-interests are implicated. Even
if they could, it might be impossible, given how vague the pursuit of
justice is, to tell when a prosecutor’s assessment of the purpose or goal
of the public is tainted.
If self-interested prosecutors cannot simply be replaced by
disinterested ones, then how can prosecutors avoid or at least minimize
the effect of self-interest in decision making, and how can the public hold
prosecutors accountable when they fail to do so? It may be hard for
prosecutors themselves to tell whether they are acting in their own selfinterest since they can rationalize self-interested behavior.102 It may be
harder still for the public to determine whether prosecutors are acting
disloyally. Much of what prosecutors do is not publicly visible, and the
public can at best infer the motivations behind prosecutors’ visible
conduct.103 Both from the inside and from the outside, it may be
impossible to disentangle prosecutors’ professional self-interest from
the public interest. For example, when prosecutors publicize their
successes, their intent may be to serve the public interest by keeping the
public informed and instilling public confidence in their work. But it is
also possible that prosecutors are indifferent to the public interest and
are motivated simply to promote their own career ambitions. Not only

101. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 134–35 (2004) (“Prosecutors with the highest
conviction rates (and, thus, reputations as the best performers) stand the greatest
chance for advancement internally.”).
102. There is an abundant literature on how unconscious thought processes—e.g.,
cognitive biases—influence prosecutors’ decision making. See, e.g., Susan Bandes,
Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475, 491
(2006); Barkow, supra note 3, at 883 (“Prosecutors may feel the need to be able to point
to a record of convictions and long sentences if they want to be promoted or to land
high-powered jobs outside the government, and that will affect their assessment of a
defendant’s case.”); Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some
Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1603–04 (2006); Aviva
Orenstein, Facing the Unfaceable: Dealing with Prosecutorial Denial in Postconviction
Cases of Actual Innocence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401, 425–26 (2011).
103. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV.
1775, 1784 (2011) (referring to “the opaque machinery of prosecutorial discretion”).
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is it impossible to assess prosecutors’ motivation to hold them
accountable for disloyalty, but the ability of prosecutors to justify their
self-promotion as an act of public accountability suggests a tension
between the duties of loyalty and accountability.
The problem of averting conflicts of interest is even more intractable
with respect to what we have called institutional conflicts of interest—
that is, situations where prosecutors have an incentive to serve the
institutional interest of the prosecutor’s office at the expense of the
broader public interest.104 Prosecutors’ offices have reputational
interests that may compromise their lawyers’ disinterested judgment—
for example, when the office has convicted an innocent person, its
interest in avoiding embarrassment may lead it to defend the conviction,
even though the public interest is in correcting wrongful convictions.105
Prosecutors’ offices may also have compromising financial interests—
for example, an office’s interest in benefitting financially from a civil
forfeiture may influence prosecutors to pursue a prosecution that might
be undeserved.106 These institutional interests may not be wholly
illegitimate, and in any event, prosecutors cannot recuse themselves to
avoid their influence.
The law also addresses conflicts of interest arising out of a prosecutor’s
personal relationship with a third person, such as a defendant or a
victim.107 Prosecutors are expected to avoid situations where they are
strongly tempted to subordinate the public interest to the private interests
of victims, suspects, defendants or others, although the law is not
necessarily coextensive with one’s intuitions about prosecutors’ duty to
eschew private interests. For example, prosecutors are expected to
recuse themselves, or to be disqualified by a court, when they have a
close familial or economic relationship with a crime victim, defendant,
or other interested third party.108

104. Green & Roiphe, supra note 55, at 477–79.
105. Medwed, supra note 101, at 136.
106. Id. at 135.
107. Green & Roiphe, supra note 55, at 472–73 (“[A] prosecutor’s familial
relationship to a defendant or victim may undermine the prosecutor’s
disinterestedness, leading the prosecutor to be unusually lenient where the defendant
is a relative and unusually harsh where the victim is one.”).
108. See, e.g., People v. Vasquez, 137 P.3d 199, 205–06 (Cal. 2006) (finding that court
erroneously failed to disqualify prosecutor where member of prosecutor’s staff was
defendant’s parent); State v. Mantooth, 788 S.E.2d 584, 587–88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)
(upholding prosecutor’s recusal where member of prosecutor’s staff was related to the
defendant).
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But prosecutors’ responsibility to avoid serving the private interests
of third parties is not so simple because fidelity to the public interest, to
some extent, presupposes care for interested private parties. For
example, it is assumed that prosecutors’ public obligation to pursue
justice includes concern for victims’ interests.109 Indeed, the ends of
criminal justice (which prosecutors are charged with serving) often include
restitution for the victim and retributivism, and procedural laws establish
victims’ rights which prosecutors must respect and, to some extent,
implement.110 What does it mean to say that a prosecutor owes undivided
loyalty to the public’s interest in justice if, at the same time, the prosecutor
has an obligation (though not a fiduciary duty) of care to the victim? Even
prosecutors may have difficulty resolving this riddle.111 Similarly, and
perhaps more controversially, prosecutors are supposed to have concern for
defendants’ rights and, perhaps, defendants’ interests; it is sometimes said
that, as public representatives, prosecutors speak for defendants among
others.112 Intuitively, one can understand that prosecutors, in determining
what is in the public’s best interest, should give some weight to both victims’
interests and defendants’ rights without owing loyalty to either. But, at the
very least, this reflects a complication in prosecutors’ decision making that
most lawyers for private clients do not encounter.
Finally, insofar as there is a risk that prosecutors will favor the interests of
a powerful or vocal subgroup, the law is essentially silent. As public officials,
prosecutors might be said to serve a purpose that transcends any person
or group of people: they serve justice, an abstract principle distilled from
the objectives of an abstract public over time, not the objectives of any
particular individual or even any group of individuals at the moment.113
The fiduciary obligation to pursue the public’s interest in justice offers

109. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 182 P.3d 600, 611–13 (Cal. 2008) (finding that
it was proper for the prosecutor to argue in favor of minor victim’s privacy interests,
which were aligned with those of the State, and that doing so was not tantamount to
representing the victim).
110. See, e.g., People v. Subramanyan, 201 Cal. Rptr. 3d 443, 447–48 (App. Dep’t
Super. Ct. 2016) (holding that under Marsy’s Law, only the prosecutor, not the victim,
has authority to seek restitution or appeal a restitution order).
111. See, e.g., In re Flatt-Moore, 959 N.E.2d 241, 245–46 (Ind. 2012) (sanctioning
prosecutor who, as a condition of a plea bargain, insisted that the defendant comply with
the victim’s demand for an excessive amount in restitution).
112. People v. Dehle, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 466 (Ct. App. 2008) (“The prosecutor
speaks not solely for the victim, or the police, or those who support them, but for all the
People. That body of ‘The People’ includes the defendant and his family and those who
care about him.”).
113. Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 571–72.
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some guidance for prosecutorial discretionary decision making. If
prosecutors owed a general obligation to the public, there would be no
clear restriction on how they should balance various public interests.
Deterrence could be weighed equally with promoting good immigration
policy. Because, as fiduciary theory helps clarify, the prosecutor’s duty is to
guard justice, not the public’s interest in general, however, it follows that
considerations intrinsic to the justness of a case ought to take precedence
over any other public value. Thus, in making discretionary decisions,
prosecutors must primarily consider concerns such as protecting the
community, deterring future offenses, rehabilitating offenders who can be
reformed, incapacitating dangerous offenders, and seeking retribution and
restitution. Other interests extrinsic to the justness of the prosecution,
such as foreign policy implications of a particular case or its intersection
with immigration policy, are not central to a prosecutor’s job. Of course,
prosecutors can give those weight in making discretionary decisions,
but only if they can be advanced consistently with the central fiduciary
mandate to ensure justice.114
This insight can help explain why it has been acceptable to engage in
“spy swaps,” where the U.S. government exchanges a foreign individual
arrested or charged with espionage for a U.S. citizen or valued noncitizen held abroad.115 The prosecutor who dismisses the charges
against a foreign defendant has not violated the fiduciary duty to do
justice because the deal, which furthers the extrinsic interest in foreign
relations, does not result in an injustice. After all, many guilty
individuals go free for a myriad of reasons in our system. On the other
hand, if a prosecutor were to pursue an innocent foreign individual in
order to gain a foreign policy advantage for the United States, that would
be a breach of fiduciary duty because the prosecutor will have
prioritized an extrinsic consideration that resulted in the prosecution of
an innocent individual.116
Of course, there are some considerations that might fall on the margin.
For instance, are reducing mass incarceration and racial injustice in
prosecution intrinsic or extrinsic concerns? It is possible that they are both.
Over-incarceration burdens taxpayers and potentially disrupts
communities, which makes it seem an important extrinsic concern. But the
114. See Green, supra note 65, at 1204–05 (arguing that, as public officials,
“[p]rosecutors can and should take account of a broad range of social policy
considerations that bear on their work” and not just those implicating traditional
criminal justice concerns such as proportionality).
115. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 15, at 1834.
116. Id.
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length of incarceration also informs questions of deterrence and
incapacitation, which are at the core of criminal justice. Similarly, racial
injustice and bias may be questions that bear on communities as a whole
and race relations, which sound like extrinsic concerns. But they may also
bear on fairness and proportionality, which are central to pursuing
justice in an individual case.
In sum, enforcing loyalty is difficult where the beneficiary to whom
prosecutors owe loyalty is so amorphous; the objectives that
prosecutors must pursue on their beneficiary’s behalf are so vague; and
prosecutors have so much discretion to discern the relevant objectives,
balance them, and decide how best to pursue them. Like other public
officials, prosecutors typically make discretionary decisions by
engaging in a complicated balancing of competing public interests. The
interests of particular segments of the public may not reflect the best
interest of the public in general. Because prosecutors’ decision-making
process is not transparent, it may be impossible to discern whether
prosecutors are privileging the interests of a vocal majority or even
narrower parochial interests. And, particularly in the case of elected
prosecutors, prosecutorial self-interest may dovetail with the interests
of powerful political factions. The law neither prescribes prosecutors’
discretionary decision-making criteria in general nor excludes
considering or even privileging particular factions’ interests and
preferences; nor does the law prescribe a process for making
discretionary decisions that reduces the risk that particular public
interests will be overvalued. The limited ability of existing law and legal
institutions to ensure prosecutors’ duty of loyalty, especially in the face
of public pressure, underscores the importance of alternative means of
prosecutorial accountability.
C. Developing Affirmative Theories of Care and Loyalty
To a large extent, fiduciary theory is concerned with avoiding
opportunism on the part of the fiduciary. It identifies abusive conduct—
violations of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty—and mechanisms to
identify, redress, and deter such bad conduct.117 But does the theory offer
anything positive—an affirmative vision of good conduct? We assume that
the duties of care and loyalty entail more than avoiding negligence and

117. Galoob & Leib, supra note 1, at 117–18.
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betrayal.118 Any illumination would be valuable because the law and legal
processes are so deficient. Rules of professional conduct offer virtually no
guidance to prosecutors about what it means to make good decisions.119
Existing professional accountability mechanisms, such as professional
discipline and judicial sanctions, are directed at punishing the very worst
conduct, not defining good conduct, and, in any event, they have little to
say about prosecutorial discretion.
In the case of private clients, lawyers largely accept their clients’
stated objectives, try to accomplish them, and defer to at least certain
decisions regarding how to do so. But prosecutors do not take direction.
No one would suggest that prosecutors should take a public referendum
on whether particular individuals should be prosecuted or on the terms
of a proposed plea bargain. Fiduciary theory of governance helps focus
the question not on whether the prosecutor has been loyal to a
particular set of people but rather to a public purpose, here, the duty to
seek justice in criminal cases. But the problem remains how to give such
a vague notion a concrete meaning, other than what any individual
prosecutor believes is just.
In determining the meaning of the prosecutor’s mandate, should the
public—the beneficiary of a prosecutor’s work as fiduciary—have any
voice at all in prosecutors’ decisions beyond, in the case of elected
prosecutors, deciding which prosecutor makes those decisions?
Obviously, the public has no direct voice; the prosecutor acts as its
decision-making surrogate. But in making decisions, must prosecutors
look for a way to discern, and give weight to, popular demands?
Some have suggested that prosecutors should defer to, or at least take
account of, public preferences regarding decisions in individual cases.120
This, however, misconstrues prosecutors’ job. While prosecutors’ duty to
“seek justice” is a vague concept, it decidedly does not mean carrying out the
public’s will in each individual case. On the contrary, seeking justice
118. See Leib et al., supra note 2, at 736 (“Although the duty [of care] seemingly
requires little more than avoiding negligence, most concede that it entails affirmative
obligations (unlike the mostly prohibitive duty of loyalty) . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
119. On the limited reach of prosecutorial ethics rules, particularly with regard to
prosecutors’ discretionary decisions, see Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1587–91 (explaining that the only exercise of discretion pretrial
or during trial that the prosecutorial ethics rules addresses is whether to initiate a
criminal charge, with respect to which the prosecutorial ethics rule requires only
“probable cause”).
120. See, e.g., Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV.
69, 71 (2011) (“Because prosecutors act on the public’s behalf, their decisions should
reflect their constituents’ preferences.”).
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presupposes that prosecutors stand as a bulwark against mob justice and
avoid making decisions based on the public’s (or their own) passions and
prejudices.121 Prosecutors are supposed to make discretionary decisions in
individual cases in accordance with the law and with norms and traditions
that are relatively constant over time and that reflect generally applicable law
enforcement considerations and principles (such as proportionality and
equal treatment).122 For example, prosecutors have a duty to avoid
convicting innocent people, which may require declining to bring charges in
light of their own professional doubts about an individual’s guilt, even if the
public is clamoring for a prosecution.123 This is not to say that prosecutors
may disregard public preferences; it is simply to say that the public
preferences that prosecutors implement are principally those discernable in
the Constitution, other laws, and legal traditions, including the norms and
traditions governing criminal prosecution.124
Particularly hard questions of prosecutorial discretion are presented
when the cross-cutting principles governing criminal prosecution intersect
with questions of social policy. The public may have a reasonable claim that,
at least as to social policy, its preferences should carry the day. Take, for

121. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 37, at 869–70 (“[W]hatever else prosecutors
do, they should act nonpolitically. This encompasses both avoiding obligations to the
political parties with which they are affiliated . . . and holding themselves above public
outcry and frenzy about particular cases. The latter principle derives from society’s
aversion to mob justice.” (footnotes omitted)); David Alan Sklansky, The Changing
Political Landscape for Elected Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 647, 673 (2017) (“The
danger of politicizing the handling of particular cases is, in fact, a worrisome aspect of
the growing attention voters seem to be paying to prosecutorial elections.”).
122. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 37, at 869–70 (“A nonpolitical prosecutor
arguably can ignore the public’s desires concerning a specific case at a heated moment
of time while remaining true to the public will in a more general sense. In other words,
the nonpolitical prosecutor will ignore a momentary hue and cry but continue to heed
public expectations as they are expressed over time in the law and popular culture.”
(footnote omitted)).
123. See generally Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Agnosticism, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 79,
79 (2010) (the prevailing view is “that an ethical prosecutor should pursue criminal
charges against a defendant only if the prosecutor personally believes that the
defendant is guilty”); Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s
Exercise of the Charging Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 522 (1993) (arguing that
prosecutors must be “morally certain” of the defendant’s guilt before pursuing charges).
124. Here, the beneficiary’s objective is a public purpose, but one that is not
expressed in a particular law that a public official is entrusted with implementing, but
one that acquires meaning over time. It is embodied in criminal law and procedure,
combined with decades of spoken, written, and accepted norms of practice that help
define the beneficial purpose. See Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 570 (explaining that
fiduciaries can serve an abstract public purpose).
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example, the question of whether an urban prosecutor should prosecute
individuals for quality-of-life offenses, such as defacing buildings with graffiti,
smoking marijuana in public, or fare-beating.125 A prosecutor has a range of
options. At one extreme, the prosecutor might almost entirely ignore certain
offenses, making a judgment, for example, never to prosecute farebeating cases, as Manhattan’s District Attorney did recently.126 At the
other extreme, the prosecutor might decide to prosecute these cases
aggressively based, for example, on the empirically questionable “broken
windows” theory that ignoring quality-of-life offenses inevitably leads to
more serious offenses.127 Or, taking an intermediate approach, a prosecutor
might bring quality-of-life offenders to a community court or other
problem-solving court in which some alternative to incarceration is
available.128 To the extent that the choice turns on social policy judgments,
do public preferences carry weight?
No one would expect the public to have the last word on whether any
particular arrested individual should be prosecuted for a quality-of-life
offense (or any other offense) because that determination rests in part on
matters of evidentiary fact and criminal justice principles that are uniquely
within the prosecutor’s expertise, such as whether there is sufficient
evidence of guilt and whether the particular defendant is so culpable or
125. This is a question on which New York City prosecutors have disagreed and taken
different approaches over time. See Shawn Cohen et al., Manhattan DA Won’t Prosecute
Quality-of-Life
Offenses
Anymore,
N.Y.
POST
(Mar.
1,
2016),
https://nypost.com/2016/03/01/manhattan-da-wont-prosecute-quality-of-lifeoffenses-anymore [https://perma.cc/8XGW-5MZ7].
126. Brendan Cheney, Manhattan DA Will No Longer Prosecute Turnstile Jumping,
POLITICO (Feb. 1, 2018, 1:55 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/cityhall/story/2018/02/01/manhattan-da-will-no-longer-prosecute-turnstile-jumping229568 [https://perma.cc/PG7P-NXKH]. For a discussion of the separation of powers issues
involved in this sort of decision, see Jeffrey Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution, at 9
(2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3479165 (arguing that
declining to prosecute entire classes of cases is a proper check on legislatures).
127. See Michelle Chen, Want to See How Biased Broken Windows Policing Is? Spend a
Day in Court, THE NATION (May 17, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/want-tosee-how-biased-broken-windows-policing-is-spend-a-day-in-court [https://perma.cc
/M5HP-SAUS]; see also WILLIAM J. BRATTON, N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, BROKEN WINDOWS AND
QUALITY-OF-LIFE POLICING IN NEW YORK CITY 3, 5 (2015), http://www.nyc.
gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/qol.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SZB6-DJNP].
128. See Andrew Denney, After 25 Years, NYC’s Midtown Community Court Still Takes
‘Problem-Solving’ Approach to Low-Level Crime, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 7, 2018),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/12/07/after-25-years-nycsmidtown-community-court-still-takes-problem-solving-approach-to-low-level-crime
[https://perma.cc/P5FL-MGGP].
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dangerous relative to others who commit the offense as to deserve or
necessitate punishment.129 These are criminal justice questions that
prosecutors conventionally resolve based on the relevant evidence and their
understanding of the principles governing prosecutors’ work. Likewise, the
general question of how to allocate resources as between, say, graffiti cases
and arson cases, is one that prosecutors would conventionally resolve based
on considerations intrinsic to the law.130 The conventional understanding
that arson is the more serious wrong, as reflected in the legislative sentencing
scheme, would lead a prosecutor to prioritize arson cases. And
questions of how to allocate limited prosecutorial resources also reflect
an administrative judgment that is ordinarily entrusted to prosecutors.
But, at the core, there is also a criminal justice policy question on
which prosecutors might disagree and as to which the public might have
a view. The criminalization of quality-of-life offenses reflects a
legislative judgment that the public interest is at least sometimes served
by prosecuting low-level offenders.131 Members of the community may
take the view that, to promote public safety, these offenders should be
prosecuted as a matter of course. Conversely, the public may take the
view that prosecuting these offenders undermines relationships
between the law enforcement officials and communities and is
excessively disruptive.132 Underlying the policy question may be
empirical questions, such as whether the prosecution of quality-of-life
offenses leads to the discovery of, or deters, more serious crimes.
Does prosecutors’ overarching duty to pursue justice in the abstract
mean that prosecutors should resolve public policy questions
themselves without regard to public preferences? If not, to what extent
should prosecutors defer to the public’s preferences regarding policy
questions such as this? Suppose, for example, that there is a clear public
demand to prosecute quality-of-life offenses aggressively in order to
deter more serious crimes. Does loyalty to the public presuppose that
the prosecutor defer to that demand, even if the prosecutor’s own
judgment is that the public’s preference is founded on an empirical
misunderstanding or that the public interest is better served by a less
aggressive prosecutorial approach?
An elected prosecutor may run on a criminal justice policy platform
and fairly claim that, once elected, it is within the prosecutor’s authority
129.
130.
131.
132.

See Green, supra note 65, at 1196–97.
See Bratton, supra note 127, at 6–7.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 6.
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to determine and implement criminal justice policy within the area of
discretion afforded by the legislature. In other words, the point of the
election is to decide who has the better judgment regarding policy and
to elect the lawyer who can be trusted with responsibility for best
resolving questions of policy. But that would mean that, once elected,
the prosecutor can essentially ignore public preferences (except to the
extent useful to win reelection). It is unclear why an elected prosecutor
would have a stronger claim than other elected officials to set policy
without regard to the public will.
The problem is not entirely avoided by appointed prosecutors. In
federal cases, it may be assumed that United States Attorneys defer to
the policy preferences of the appointed Attorney General and, indirectly,
those of the President.133 But many policy questions may be unanswered
or unresolved at higher levels, leaving the question whether United
States Attorneys may interpose their own policy preferences or must
discern and implement those of the public.134
If elected prosecutors may not decide policy questions entirely on the
basis of their own best professional judgment, but must defer, or give
weight, to public preferences regarding broad questions of criminal
justice policy, how is the relevant policy to be discerned? The public
cannot be polled. Public preferences cannot necessarily be inferred from
existing legislation or even vocal social movements. Arguably, some
other elected representative—a governor or mayor—may speak for the
public. But it is hard to see why another elected official would be better
able than the elected prosecutor to discern the public will regarding
criminal justice policy questions.
If the prosecutor must discern the public will, another question
remains, namely, which public? If, as we assume, the prosecutor’s client
is the public, what do we mean by that? Does a United States Attorney
for the Southern District of New York have a special obligation to the
population of New York or owe obligations to citizens of the United
States?135 Would a local prosecutor owe obligations to all citizens in the
133. See generally Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Designed to Fail: The President’s
Deference to the Department of Justice in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 59 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 387, 467 (2017); Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal
Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 823 (2017).
134. See generally Leslie B. Arffa, Note, Separation of Prosecutors, 128 YALE L.J. 1078,
1103 (2019) (describing and justifying the decentralization of federal criminal
prosecution).
135. For example, in deciding whether to prosecute an obscenity charge, should a
federal prosecutor be concerned about the social norms of the federal district (which
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state? Or only to those citizens in the local prosecutor’s district? Assuming
the answer is the former, should the prosecutor assess the interests of the
state with a special eye toward the needs of the local community?
Further, efforts to discern the will of the public may be in tension with
the previously discussed principle that prosecutors may not serve the
interests of private subgroups. If the prosecutor implements the policy
judgments of the particular political party of which the prosecutor is a
member, one might consider that the prosecutor is acting in an
impermissibly partisan fashion, promoting the interests of a political
party—a private group—at the expense of the general public. Or one
might say that the prosecutor is giving impermissible priority to the
preferences of a subgroup, not necessarily carrying out the will of the
public at large. Of course, no resolution of a policy question will ever
reflect the preference of every member of the public. But arguably, the
general preference to which a prosecutor must defer is not that of the
prosecutor’s party.136
Finally, assuming that loyalty to the public requires deference to the
public’s discernable policy preferences, the question remains how to
make discretionary decisions that give appropriate weight to those
would be the relevant ones for determining whether material is obscene under the
federal criminal law) or the social norms of the broader national population? Cf.
Freedberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 703 F. Supp. 107, 111 (D.D.C. 1988) (enjoining federal
obscenity prosecutions in multiple federal districts, notwithstanding that states may
apply different obscenity standards). In general, the popular norms that restrain and
influence prosecutors are likely those of the population served, from which jurors are
chosen, if only for the instrumental reason that those are the norms on which a jury is
likely to draw. See generally Anna Offit, Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. U.
L. REV. 1071, 1105–06 (2019) (describing empirical findings that federal prosecutors
make discretionary decisions with an eye toward how they believe a jury would perceive
the case).
136. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 37, at 869–70 (discussing ideal of
prosecutorial nonpartisanship). Needless to say, prosecutors have not always
comported with this understanding. Both elected and appointed prosecutors may be
heavily engaged in partisan politics and beholden to political parties for their positions.
See Michael J. Ellis, Note, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J. 1528, 1565–
67 (2012); cf. Scott Ingram, George Washington’s Attorneys: The Political Selection of
United States Attorneys at the Founding, 39 PACE L. REV. 163, 164–65 (2018). At least
before the prevalence of contemporary understandings regarding prosecutors’
obligation to be impartial and not politically partisan, prosecutors who were beholden
to a political party were more likely to accede to its influence when making discretionary
decisions. See Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in
Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1338–39 (2002) (describing influence
of the Tammany Hall political machine on late nineteenth century prosecutors in New
York City).
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policy preferences along with the considerations that are properly
within the prosecutor’s bailiwick. For example, a prosecutor adopting a
“tough on crime” approach in deference to public demand would still be
expected to weed out cases where the evidence is too weak to justify
prosecution. The prosecutor might still be expected to treat certain
defendants leniently in light of mitigating considerations that suggest
that the offense was aberrant or understandable. The prosecutor might
still prioritize the prosecution of more serious crimes, given resource
limitations.
All of these questions pose a challenge to the idea of prosecutorial
accountability, to which we will return. If prosecutors owe the public
duties of care and loyalty, there presumably must be some process to
hold prosecutors accountable. But the ambiguity regarding the scope of
prosecutors’ obligations poses an obstacle. What does it mean for a
prosecutor to make careful discretionary decisions or to be loyal to the
public, in the affirmative sense; what does it mean to be faithful to the
public interest or to carry out the public purpose competently in a
criminal case? The complexity and opacity of prosecutors’ decision
making as well as the amount of independence that prosecutors must
necessarily exercise make it difficult to determine whether prosecutors
are acting carefully and faithfully or even to know what faithful execution
of the criminal law entails in any given situation.
III. ACCOUNTABILITY VS. INDEPENDENCE
This Part argues that while accountability and independence seem at
odds, they are, in truth, two alternate ways to best define the
beneficiary’s interest and ensure that the prosecutor remains loyal to
that interest.137 Prosecutors need to give meaning to the vague mandate
to do justice. Other public fiduciaries like agency heads may be able to
look to statutes or bylaws to assess the purpose or goal they serve and
give it more concrete meaning.138 Prosecutors have no such framework.
The structure of the office, created in part by the system of
accountability and independence itself, must over time serve that role.
Accountability demands consequences when prosecutors fail to
pursue the public interest. It assumes an institutional mechanism for
137. For an argument that prosecutorial independence is at odds with accountability,
see Davis, supra note 4, at 438–48.
138. See Criddle, supra note 2, at 151–52 (explaining that “administrative agencies
owe fiduciary duties to their statutory beneficiaries” in executing their “statutorily
defined missions”).
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monitoring prosecutors. Independence, on the other hand, ensures that
prosecutors can use their experience and expertise to assess the public
interest and determine how best to achieve it without caving in to
political influence or mob pressure.139 Independence requires some
insulation from elected officials and the public. The challenge is to
maximize accountability without jeopardizing independence.
Accountability can have any of several different, if inter-related,
meanings. At a minimum, accountability suggests meeting one’s
responsibilities—that is, doing what one is supposed to do in the way in
which one is supposed to do it. Accountability may also mean justifying
what one does,140 and facing consequences when failing to fulfil one’s
responsibilities. Prosecutors can be held accountable in different ways.
The lay public can exercise direct control over prosecutorial decisions
or could have a more robust role in how those decisions are made. A
prosecutor can be subject either to direct political consequences for his
or her work, or the political official who appointed the prosecutor can
face repercussions for the prosecutor’s conduct. Alternatively,
accountability can require processes for reaching decisions. Prosecutors
can be subject to internal and external mechanisms of review and
resulting sanctions. Finally, all these forms of accountability may
require varying degrees of transparency. Transparency in prosecutors’
decision making is complicated because much of what prosecutors do
requires secrecy.
Prosecutorial independence, on the other hand, assumes that
experience and expertise are the best guarantee that prosecutors will
seek the public interest. Professional reputation, legacy, and self-image
will ensure that prosecutors adhere to their obligations of duty and care.
Any intrusion into their work threatens the purity of the exercise.
Lawyers’ independence was originally conceived in republican terms.
Lawyers, as part of an aristocracy, were uniquely suited to guard liberty

139. See Davis, supra note 4, at 438 (“[P]rosecutors require a certain level of
independence to make their decisions without inappropriate and extraneous political
pressures.”); Richman, supra note 4, at 957–59 (discussing the view that “insulation
from narrow interest groups and corrupt influences” allows prosecutors to effectively
“divine the public interest”).
140. See Barbara O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay
Between Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision
Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 999, 1018 (2009) (“Psychologists who study accountability define
it broadly as the experience of feeling pressure to justify judgments or decisions to
others. Under the right conditions, imposing accountability on decision makers can
make them more thorough and objective.” (footnote omitted)).
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by ensuring the good of all citizens.141 Their wealth made them
independent of any faction, immune to the kind of domination that
might distract them from this duty, or in Rave’s terms, trigger the
“tyranny of the majority” problem.142 Initially, only a small class of
aristocrats were thought to possess the necessary virtue to fulfill this
role.143 As the nineteenth century drew to a close, a burgeoning middle
class based its claim to this special status on merit, skill, and training, as
opposed to aristocratic pedigree. Lawyers were seen as a separate estate
that stood poised to protect against an arbitrary exercise of power by the
state and the dominion of one man or one group over another.144 Fiduciary
theorists have also traced fiduciary law to republican theory.145
While many have been justifiably skeptical about this rhetoric, it can
be useful.146 At least some prosecutors, like many other lawyers and
public officials, take pride in what they do and want to do it well.
Additionally, they are trained in certain practices that are, at least
theoretically, designed to ensure justice in particular cases.147 This
141. See Rebecca Roiphe, Redefining Professionalism, 26 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193,
203–04 (2015) (describing the historical view that lawyers—who, according to Alexis
de Tocqueville, “constituted an American brand of aristocracy”—had “sufficient means
to think beyond [their] own self-interest”).
142. Rave, supra note 87, at 54–61; see Roiphe, supra note 141, at 203–05
(summarizing the theory that only those with means to “provide for [their] own basic
material needs” could exercise the independence required to be a lawyer).”
143. Id. at 205.
144. See id. at 206 (describing the belief that lawyers’ education and training
uniquely positioned them to act for the good of all).
145. See Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 95
TEX. L. REV. 993, 994–1000 (2017) (arguing that republican theory is the best way to
interpret fiduciary law).
146. See Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 649,
650–53 (2016) (suggesting that “aspects of the older understanding of professionalism,”
which have generated skepticism among lawyers and scholars, “can and should be
relevant and vital today”). Attorney General William Barr, when testifying before the
Senate as a nominee for the position, used this notion of professionalism and
accountability to the American people to explain why he was suited for the job. Hearing
on the Nomination of the Honorable William Pelham Barr to be Attorney General of the
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116 Cong. 1–2 (2019) (written
testimony
of
William
P.
Barr),
https://judiciary.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/Barr%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/YHE2-KFDS].
147. See Timothy Fry, Prosecutorial Training Wheels: Ginsburg’s Connick v. Thompson
Dissent and the Training Imperative, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1275, 1277–78 (2012)
(explaining that while the Court noted in Connick v. Thompson that “[i]ndividual
prosecutors have received ‘professional training and have ethical obligations’” related
to the fair administration of justice, the dissent viewed this training as more theoretical
than practically effective).
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training allows them to draw on their experience, knowledge, and skill
to exercise judgment in ways that avoid miscarriages of justice,
distortions, and abuse. Even when an individual prosecutor may lack the
judgment we would like and expect, that prosecutor is constrained by,
and often invested in, the procedures and traditions of the office that
create a real check on the prosecutor’s conduct.
The dangers to the beneficiary are significant when prosecutors are
not held accountable for their acts. Social movements, like the innocence
movement and Black Lives Matter, have highlighted just how vulnerable
communities are to prosecutorial abuse.148 Some have even pointed to
independence as the problem.149 But fiduciary theory helps explain why
eroding prosecutorial independence has its own potential perils. If we
are not vigilant, partisan political groups or powerful private individuals
or groups might seek to use prosecutors to advance their own personal
or political interests at the expense of the broader public mandate.
Organized factions within the public might try to influence or even take
over prosecutors’ offices for their own ends. Those without an
understanding of the criminal justice system might seek results that are not
in keeping with all the rules and procedures designed to ensure justice.
Vulnerable groups or unpopular defendants might suffer at the hands of a
majority that does not fully grasp the need for processes and protections.
There is a risk not only to individuals who may be wrongly pursued for
a political pay-off but also to unpopular defendants, who may face a kind
of mob justice.150 The rule of law requires not only accountability but
independence.
Fiduciary theory offers a way to balance these competing concerns. If
a prosecutor’s fiduciary obligation is to pursue the public’s abstract
interest in justice, then prosecutors need some degree of insulation to
weigh those central concerns. The public should not have a direct or
even indirect ability to control how prosecutors weigh concerns like
fairness, proportionality, deterrence, and retribution. Those concerns,
which are central to the prosecutors’ fiduciary mission, ought to be
evaluated both in light of the office’s prior decisions in similar cases and
in the context of the facts of that particular case. The public is illequipped to make this sort of evaluation. On the other hand, when a

148. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 13, at 89–90, 93–95.
149. See Davis, supra note 4, at 408–15 (describing prosecutors’ wide discretion to
make outcome-determinative decisions, like charging, and the limited mechanisms for
monitoring potential abuses of such discretion).
150. Green & Roiphe, Punishment Without Process, supra note 17.
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prosecutor considers extrinsic concerns that are not central to the core
criminal justice mission, there is more room for public input, either
directly or through another elected official. The extent to which
prosecutors should serve social justice or take into account the
economic disadvantage of the accused, potential foreign policy, or
immigration repercussions, are all questions of broad social policy that
may be relevant in any given prosecution but are not central to the
prosecutor’s fiduciary mandate. Other actors may well be better
situated than the prosecutor to assess the public’s interest with regard
to those extrinsic concerns.
This Part will proceed by identifying each mechanism of accountability
and analyzing the risks they pose to prosecutorial independence. This, in
turn, provides a framework for assessing which mechanisms of
accountability will work best to align the prosecutor’s interest with that
of the public without making too great a sacrifice to prosecutorial
independence. This Part then returns to fiduciary theory, arguing that
the unique nature of prosecutors’ role offers new insight into the
fiduciary theory of governance.
A. Mechanisms of Accountability
1.

External control over prosecutors
Some scholars, particularly those who lament the decline in the role
of the jury trial, have suggested greater lay control over prosecutorial
decision making. Stephanos Bibas has argued that juries should review
plea bargain sentence recommendations.151 Josh Bowers and Jocelyn
Simonson have similarly suggested greater lay participation in the
criminal justice system.152 These scholars argue that the rise in plea

151. Stephanos Bibas, Observers as Participants: Letting the Public Monitor the
Criminal Justice Bureaucracy, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 342, 342–44 (2014) (advocating for
public participation in plea hearings); Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Transparency and
Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 961 (2006) (“[P]lea and
sentencing juries would serve many of the functions that grand and petit juries once did,
checking executive and judicial conduct.”); see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury
Innovation: Toward a Functional Makeover of the Ancient Bulwark of Liberty, 19 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 339, 356, 358 (2010) (arguing for grand jury supervision over plea
bargaining and sentencing decisions).
152. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision
Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1657–62 (2010) (arguing for lay input into
charging decisions); Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial
World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2176–77 (2014) (arguing that the Constitution embodies
“the idea that the function of the public in the criminal courtroom goes beyond the
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bargaining and the decline in jury trials account for some of the
harshness of the current system.153
Some of these proposals may be wise, particularly those that seek to
educate members of the public about the way the criminal justice
system works so that they can exercise their rights to alter and reform
the system when it has gone awry.154 Involving the lay public directly in
prosecutorial decision making is more problematic, at least where those
decisions involve the core interests intrinsic to justice. Doing so risks
undermining prosecutorial independence by allowing the influence of
those who may lack a commitment to the processes and traditions of the
office and who certainly lack the information to make appropriate
decisions. While lay input might arguably mitigate an unjustifiably harsh
system, public influence may also threaten greater harshness toward
unpopular defendants.
There may be a greater role for the public to play either directly or
indirectly through elected officials in determining which extrinsic
values ought to bear on prosecutors’ decisions. So, prosecutors ought to be
more responsive to public concerns and public opinion about immigration
or foreign policy, both of which are at least to some degree extrinsic to a
determination of what is just in any individual case.
Holding public fiduciaries responsible for their actions is necessarily
difficult and imperfect. The imperfect mechanisms for holding
fiduciaries responsible are justified by trust. Fiduciary models rely, in
part, on the idea that the fiduciary has the character to resist temptation
and abide by the beneficiary’s interest.155 Theorists suggest that when
the beneficiary is particularly vulnerable, the law should recognize
residual control rights to ensure that the agent does not betray the

protection of individuals to implicate the ability of citizens to . . . hold the criminal justice
system accountable”).
153. Cf. Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359,
387, 399 (2005) (arguing that “[i]nvolving local laypeople in charging and sentencing
decisions would . . . reverse the current trend toward ever-harsher policies,” and
specifically that “in a world of guilty pleas, the grand jury as focus group or judicial body
may be the only mechanism to ensure that charging policies do not deviate too much
from local community opinion”).
154. See Simonson, supra note 152, at 2174–78 (emphasizing the importance of the
public audience in courtrooms for “hold[ing] the criminal justice system accountable”).
155. See Leib et al., supra note 2, at 706–07 (identifying the beneficiary’s trust in the
fiduciary as one of three indicia of the fiduciary relationship).
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principal.156 The public is quite vulnerable to discretionary decisions
made by prosecutors, but it is difficult to give control over prosecutors
directly to the public in part because the beneficiary’s interest is an
abstraction rather than a particular individual or group with a defined
interest.157 Any control exercised indirectly by the legislature or
executive risks undermining prosecutorial independence. That leaves us
with the need to devise creative ways to hold prosecutors accountable
that will not simultaneously undermine independence, thereby risking
other distortions of their duty of loyalty.
Others suggest that legislatures, courts, or disciplinary authorities ought to
exercise control over prosecutors’ decisions.158 These mechanisms have
proved ineffective. Legislatures are incapable of taking into account the kind
of specific facts and circumstances necessary to constrain prosecutors’
decisions, and courts are limited both by separation of powers concerns and
by their capacity to review the fact-specific decisions in individual cases.
Disciplinary authorities are limited because the directly punitive structure is
best suited to intentional misconduct.
2.

Political accountability
Some argue that the best way to ensure that prosecutors pursue
socially beneficial ends is to hold them politically accountable for their
acts.159 Perhaps the most prominent proponent of political
156. Cf. id. at 707–08 (“[W]here residual control rights are particularly weak, the
beneficiary’s vulnerability to predation is greater and, therefore, the fiduciary must
meet a higher standard of conduct.” (footnote omitted)).
157. Cf. Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 523–24 (explaining that some fiduciary
mandates “are not identified with determinate persons and their practical interests;
they are, in this sense, abstract”).
158. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 180–
82, 189 (2007) (arguing for more rigorous bar disciplinary processes for prosecutors
and prosecutorial reform legislation as necessary); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary
Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693,
733–36 (1987) (proposing changes in bar disciplinary proceedings); James Vorenberg,
Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1568–72 (1981) (calling
for more robust judicial review of prosecutors’ discretionary decisions).
159. See, e.g., JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., PROSECUTORS, DEMOCRACY, AND JUSTICE: HOLDING
PROSECUTORS ACCOUNTABLE 6–10 (2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
5c4fbee5697a9849dae88a23/t/5d6d8d224f45fb00014076d5/1567460643414/Pros
ecutors%2C+Democracy%2C+Justice_FORMATTED+9.2.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/ Q28BJS9W] (suggesting that the public can hold prosecutors accountable by electing prosecutors
who are truthful, transparent, and equitable); Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role
of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 391–413 (2009) (arguing that United
States Attorneys lack the political accountability of local prosecutors). But see David Alan
Sklansky, Unpacking the Relationship Between Prosecutors and Democracy in the United
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accountability for prosecutors is Justice Scalia in his dissent in Morrison
v. Olson.160 In arguing for the unconstitutionality of the special
prosecutor under the Ethics in Government Act, Scalia complained that
by insulating the role from presidential control, the legislature had
essentially ensured that no political actor could be held accountable for
the special prosecutor’s acts.161
As Professor Dan Epps has asked, “why is the right goal letting
politically accountable prosecutors follow the political winds?”162 A
prosecutor attuned to the political majority might well do the right
thing. The prosecutor might, for instance, decline to prosecute a
technically guilty individual who is not morally blameworthy. But at the
same time, a political majority might be particularly bloodthirsty,
especially in a case that has had an immediate impact on the community.
A political majority might unfairly target a particular group or demand
a conviction when a prosecutor thinks the evidence is lacking. In
addition, we have long abandoned the notion that political actors always
pursue socially useful ends. Powerful interests can capture the political
process: even if following the majority’s will would lead the prosecutor
to do the right thing, political calculations often lead elected officials to
follow a powerful minority’s interest rather than that of the majority.
The public is often only interested in a select group of cases—the most
gruesome crimes or those involving celebrities or other popular causes.
This, too, threatens to warp a prosecutor’s ability to respond to the more
abstract public purpose. Prosecutors, who are directly responsive to the
public, may have little incentive to follow the will of the public if no one
cares. Even if citizens do care, the public would have a hard time
assessing a prosecutor’s job, at least when it comes to the obligation to
weigh intrinsic criminal justice concerns, given that cases hinge on facts
and law that are hard to assess.163 A few cases then could work as cover
States, in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY 276, 277 (Máximo Langer &
David Alan Sklansky eds., 2017) (discussing the widely-shared view that “[t]he last thing we
should want from prosecutors is ‘democratic accountability’”).
160. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
161. See id. at 728–31 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven if it were entirely evident that
unfairness was in fact the result [of the work of an independent counsel] . . . there would
be no one accountable to the public to whom the blame could be assigned.”).
162. See Epps, supra note 44, at 848; see also Richman, supra note 4, at 973–74
(arguing that electoral control is far less likely to force prosecutors to be responsive to
the community than if prosecutors are encouraged to decide cases in the shadow of jury
decisions).
163. Cf. Richman, supra note 4, at 965 (“[T]he bulk of the discretionary decisions that
prosecutors make turn . . . [on] case-specific factors. Electoral or appointive politics are,
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for the rest. Even if the public could be made to care about all cases
equally, voters are not in a good position to assess the prosecutors’
discretionary choices in more complex, factually or legally complicated
cases. As we discussed above, it is not clear whether a local prosecutor
owes loyalty to members of the district in which the prosecutor works,
to the state as a whole, or to the United States.164 If it is the latter,
elections of local or state prosecutors will not work to align her interest
with that of the beneficiary.165
Despite Justice Scalia’s assertions in Morrison, federal prosecutors are
even less accountable than state prosecutors. United States Attorneys
are appointed by the President,166 often with input from local legislators.
They have little incentive to serve local communities, and it is unlikely
that the President would be held responsible for something that
happened in one of the ninety-four federal districts. Theoretically, the
Attorney General would be held responsible, and this, in turn, would reflect
on the President, but that seems unlikely at best.167 Local prosecutors may
be more responsive to the public, but pathologies in local politics render
this solution problematic. Most district attorneys run uncontested, and the
voting public pays little attention to the campaigns.
Not only is political accountability ineffective, it can also be dangerous
in its threat to prosecutorial independence. The greater the hierarchical
control of prosecutors either by a political actor or by the voting public,
the greater the danger that decisions that ought to be characterized by
the disinterested application of law to facts will instead reflect the
partisan preference of certain groups.168 Political accountability may
have a role to play in aligning the interest of the public with its principal,

at best, a poor way of holding prosecutors accountable for this myriad of low-visibility
enforcement decisions.”).
164. See supra Section II.C.
165. Others have noted the difficulty in identifying the relevant principal. See Ethan
J. Leib et al., Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91, 94
(2013).
166. Beale, supra note 159, at 370.
167. Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 543 (2001) (“United States Attorneys’ offices . . . have the power to set their own
agendas, to decide what cases they wish to spend time on and what cases they wish to
ignore.”).
168. Cf. Green & Roiphe, supra note 15, at 72 (“[C]onflicts of interest threaten to
undermine [prosecutors’] impartial decision-making . . . . Allocating responsibility for
decisions in individual cases to career prosecutors who are lower down in the hierarchy
helps achieve the fair and disinterested administration of criminal justice by making
these sorts of conflicts less likely.”).
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but it cannot serve as a panacea. Political accountability works better
where the question is prosecutorial policy as opposed to effectiveness.
It works better when it concerns policies extrinsic to the central
fiduciary mission of the prosecutor. A local prosecutor and a federal
prosecutor may well be held responsible for implementing policy
promises. As we discussed above, the public may prefer or disfavor a
broken windows approach to prosecution and is in a fairly good position
to assess the prosecutor’s position.169 As we have argued elsewhere, and
in part because of the question of accountability, the President has a role
to play in setting federal prosecutors’ policy agendas but not in
controlling individual cases.170
3.

Internal processes and structures for decision making
A different mechanism to ensure accountability requires internal
processes for decision making. Many scholars have suggested reforming
prosecutors’ offices to better align their actions with the public interest.
Even if the substance of public interest is elusive, it is easier to agree on
processes designed to approximate it. If public officers are fiduciaries,
then their actions must be made on behalf of the public. Processes are
important and at times critical to ensure that this is the case.171
We have argued elsewhere that deliberation among differently
situated prosecutors, the recording of decision-making processes, and
internal review of these processes can help reduce prosecutorial conflicts
of interest.172 Others have, in different contexts, proposed changes in
institutional design to counter implicit bias and other distortions in
prosecutors’ judgment.173 Prosecutors should, at the very least, consciously
weigh different factors in making important decisions about the public
interest and the meaning of the broad mandate to serve justice. While
people may not agree about which factors ought to take precedence over
others in any given decision, all can agree that prosecutors should
consider only proper factors and make a deliberate decision about how
to weigh them given the facts of the case.

169. Supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text.
170. Green & Roiphe, supra note 15, at 6.
171. Cf. EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY: HOW INTERNATIONAL
LAW CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY 103–04 (2016) (exploring how non-domination and a
fiduciary theory of international norms protect individuals subject to public power
against abuse).
172. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 55, at 525–27.
173. See Barkow, supra note 3, at 883, 887–88.
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Extrapolating from the private law theory, Ethan Leib and Stephen
Galoob argue that all fiduciary relationships are characterized by a
respect for the principal and therefore involve a commitment to
deliberation, conscientiousness, and robustness. Deliberation involves
not just a particular outcome but a process for arriving at that outcome.
Leib and Galoob claim that fiduciaries must maintain a continued
commitment to a decision-making process. To be conscientious, a
fiduciary must act for the right reasons, namely, to help realize and
pursue the interest of the beneficiary. Finally, robustness requires that
this process of conscientious deliberation be continuous and account for
new information.174 Prosecutors could be required to engage in this sort
of conscientious deliberative process. They could be encouraged
through structural change within offices to account for new information
and consciously and explicitly engage with prior practices within the
office.175
These sorts of reforms are promising in part because they pose little
threat to, and possibly foster, prosecutorial independence. Encouraging
internal processes and structural change offers a way to help ensure that
prosecutors adhere to certain traditions and thought processes that work
to align their discretionary decisions with the public interest. Among other
things, the problem with these sorts of internal controls is that there are
few guarantees that prosecutors will adhere to them and that if they do,
they will do so seriously. Those who are concerned that prosecutors, left to
their own devices, are not good at monitoring their own behavior may be
skeptical that these sorts of changes will really help align prosecutors’
decisions with the public interest.
4.

Transparency

174. See Ethan Leib & Stephen Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE
L.J. 1820, 1839 (2016). While Leib and Galoob’s theory is controversial, we do not plan
to wade into this argument because we are using their contribution as well as that of
others as a means of exploring prosecutors’ obligations. Since we are doing so in the
spirit of analogy as a pragmatic endeavor rather than applying it in a literal fashion, all
aspects of the theory can be useful. Some critics of Leib and Galoob argue that this
elaboration of fiduciary duty mistakes a moral conception of loyalty for a fiduciary one.
Paul B. Miller, Dimensions of Fiduciary Loyalty, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW
180–81 (Andrew S. Gold & D. Gordon Smith eds., 2018). While we do not take a side in
the debate about with whether or not the deliberative norms Leib and Galoob identify
are a necessary feature of all fiduciary relationships or a common feature of some, we
do draw on the observation that for prosecutorial decision making, the duty of loyalty
requires certain deliberative processes.
175. Green & Roiphe, supra note 55, at 525–33.
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Transparency can work in conjunction with these other forms of
accountability to ensure a more direct kind of control for the beneficiary.
Linked to progressive politics, transparency is thought to be necessary to
promote democratic goals, efficiency, and egalitarianism.176 An electorate
cannot hope to hold a public official accountable without a clear
understanding of how well that official’s job has been done. If political
accountability has any function in reining in prosecutors, their work must
be, in some sense, transparent. Direct control over the prosecutor’s
decisions similarly requires greater transparency.177 If the public is
going to enjoy greater participation, then it needs more information
about the decisions prosecutors are making, prosecutors’ reasons for
making these decisions, and the processes by which decisions are made.
Perhaps greater public engagement in prosecutorial decision making, in
turn, would educate the public about the nature of the criminal justice
system.178
Transparency, which in other contexts can be key to accountability, is
more problematic for prosecutors, however. Much of what prosecutors
do is necessarily secret. Grand jury secrecy, enforced by statute, ensures the
safety of witnesses and the dignity of uncharged suspects.179 Secrecy
preserves the integrity of future or ongoing investigations and, at times,
protects national security.180 As discussed above, the public is not
particularly well suited to review discretionary decisions, and there is a risk
to prosecutorial independence when it does.
Even reforms in processes within prosecutors’ offices could work
together with transparency to create a closer alignment between
prosecutors’ interests and those of the public. While it is unrealistic and

176. See David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 107–08
(2018) (discussing the aims of transparency policies during the Progressive Era and in
the decade between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, which included more “efficient,”
“egalitarian,” and “democratically accountable regulation”).
177. See Simonson, supra note 152, at 2205, 2216 (explaining that the public’s ability
to hold government officials accountable depends on the transparency of “the routine
appearances that make up criminal justice in [the public’s] neighborhoods”).
178. For a discussion of transparency and prosecutors, see generally Jessica A. Roth,
Prosecutorial Declination Statements, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming Apr.
2020).
179. See JoEllen Lotvedt, Availability of Civil Remedies Under the Grand Jury Secrecy
Rule, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 237, 241–42 (1997) (“[Grand jury] [s]ecrecy . . . protects the
anonymity of the witness pool and . . . prevents the release of derogatory information
about an unindicted individual.”).
180. See id. at 241 (“Maintaining secrecy decreases the possibility that a suspect may
escape, destroy evidence, or harass adverse witnesses.”).
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undesirable to require prosecutors to reveal the details of each decision,
they could be required to reveal the mechanisms by which they came to
that decision and the evolving standards governing those decisions. This
would give the public an opportunity to supervise prosecutors’ work
without involving them in factual and legal inquiries for which they are
untrained and ill suited.
In addition, when the integrity of the institutions is in doubt,
transparency may trump independence. When the public ceases to
believe that the processes for ensuring loyalty and care are working, it
may be worth compromising the independence of prosecutors for the
sake of transparency and accountability.
B. Assessing Mechanisms for Prosecutorial Accountability
In a private fiduciary relationship, accountability can mean that the
beneficiary enjoys direct control over some or all of the fiduciary’s work.
This model of accountability does not and should not translate to
prosecutors’ work. As we discuss above and elsewhere, direct and plenary
control by political actors does not work to align prosecutors’ work with
the public interest.181 Once we conceive of the prosecutor’s objective as
seeking justice, not carrying out the contemporary public’s will in a more
general sense, it follows that direct control would be unwise.
Because prosecutors’ work is specialized in nature, it might be better
to hold them accountable to other prosecutors or to other
knowledgeable public officials or official bodies rather than to the public
directly.182 When it comes to federal and other appointed prosecutors,
the public lacks removal authority in any event. At best, it can influence
the official who possesses the authority to remove the prosecutor. In
federal cases, public influence is especially attenuated, because the
President has direct authority to fire only the Attorney General and

181. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 15, at 71 (“The discretion of . . . prosecutors
promotes the fair and even-handed administration of justice . . . . American prosecutors
sometimes fail; but presidential influence over individual cases would only make
matters worse.” (footnotes omitted)).
182. See O’Brien, supra note 140, at 1046–47 (“Research on accountability
demonstrates that decision makers come closest to this ideal when they know that they
will be judged primarily for the process of their decision making, as opposed to the
outcome. This sort of accountability could come through internal procedures, by way of
review within a prosecutor’s office, or through an outside agency’s supervision.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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United States Attorneys,183 not subordinate prosecutors.184 And it is
unlikely given the many public concerns that voters are motivated by
federal prosecutorial policy when they cast their vote for president.
With respect to elected prosecutors, the public does not presently have
enough information to assess whether prosecutors are faithful to
professional norms.185 But even if prosecutors were substantially more
transparent, it is doubtful whether voters’ criterion would be whether
prosecutors were “seeking justice” as that concept is understood in the
legal profession.
Other public officials or official bodies might be particularly good at
offering input or monitoring the extrinsic factors that go into prosecutorial
decision making. They too would be removed from the facts of individual
cases, making it hard for them to monitor discretionary decisions in that
regard. But they might serve as good proxies for public opinion on other
factors, even those that straddle the line between concerns intrinsic and
extrinsic to criminal justice, like how much prosecutors ought to consider
social or racial justice or mass incarceration.
Additionally, accountability can mean being subject to some
procedural mechanism to ensure that one meets one’s responsibilities
and can be removed from one’s position when one does not live up to
the applicable standard. For public officials, accountability in this sense
may or may not imply some public transparency, depending on whether
the removal process involves a public election or an act by a supervisory
official or body. Even in an electoral process, it is not obvious what must
be publicly disclosed and when. The answer presumably turns, at least
in part, on the nature of the official’s responsibilities—on what it means
to do the job well or poorly.

183. 28 USC § 541(c) (2012).
184. § 542(b) (Assistant United States Attorneys are subject to removal by the
Attorney General). Further, the termination of a subordinate prosecutor is subject to
review and reversal by the Merit Systems Protection Board. See, e.g., Goekev. Dep’t of
Justice, 2015 M.S.P.B. 1, 2 (2015).
185. Russell M. Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, 92 WASH. L. REV. 87, 117 (2017) (“[T]he
political check on elected prosecutors does not work well because voters lack sufficient
information about their prosecutors’ enforcement priorities.”); Richman, supra note 4,
at 963 (“[E]ven direct elections are not likely to prove an effective means of giving
prosecutors guidance as to a community’s enforcement priorities or of holding them
accountable for the discretionary decisions that they have already made.”); Ronald F.
Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 591 (2009)
(“[P]rosecutor elections . . . do not assure that the public knows and approves of the
basic policy priorities and implementation of policy in the prosecutor’s office.”).
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A fiduciary theory of prosecutors suggests that monitoring the processes
of decision making would be the optimal way to hold prosecutors
accountable. Public officials giving input into extrinsic considerations that
ought to drive discretionary decisions might also prove useful in aligning the
interest of the prosecutor with that of the beneficiary.

C. Fiduciary Theory of Governance Revisited
Analyzing prosecutors as fiduciaries contributes to the developing
fiduciary theory of governance. The question of accountability and
independence is not as central for most other public officials. But the
general tension between the two values is relevant to some extent for
all public fiduciaries. Are leaders picked to use their judgment,
knowledge, and skill on behalf of the public or are they expected to be
more directly accountable to the electorate’s will?186 The answer, it
seems, is both. The proper balance will depend on the role and
responsibilities of different public officials, but to some degree,
expertise—which is fostered by a kind of exclusivity—and popular
responsiveness must go hand in hand.
Our examination of prosecutors’ fiduciary role does suggest a critique
of fiduciary theory: it tends to exalt the value of discretion. As Paul Miller
argues, the fiduciary by definition exercises discretionary power over
the interests of the beneficiary.187 In the private law context, scholars
have argued that this definition of fiduciary obligation does a disservice
to the principal, diminishing the principal’s power and rationalizing a
paternalistic relationship. The agent should serve the principal. The
fiduciary should take direction from the beneficiary.188 Of course, when
the beneficiary has a vast and complex amalgam of abstract interests as
the fiduciary governance model points out, minimizing discretion is
difficult, if not impossible. And even if it were possible, it is not
necessarily desirable.
186. See generally SOPHIA ROSENFELD, DEMOCRACY AND TRUTH: A SHORT HISTORY 15, 20, 26
(2019) (arguing that truth has been contested throughout American history and ought
to be a collaboration between experts in government and the lay public).
187. Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 262 (2011).
188. See W. Bradley Wendel, Should Lawyers Be Loyal to Clients, the Law, or Both?
(forthcoming) (on file with authors) (describing the fiduciary theory that the agent
should “interpret the instructions of the principal . . . in accordance with the agent’s
understanding of the principal’s wishes”).
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In the context of governance, Seth Davis has expressed an analogous
concern. He argues that the fiduciary model generally minimizes and at
times can mask domination and hegemony.189 There is reason to be
concerned about this dynamic in prosecution in particular.190 In fact,
some have argued that domination under the mantel of fiduciary service
characterizes the criminal justice system in general.191 It is no surprise
that scholars of the criminal justice system who are concerned with
minority rights and protecting the less powerful seek to restrict rather
than expand or justify discretion.192
Broad discretionary power is dangerous. It risks not only abuse but
also a more insidious form of power in which expert dominance takes
on the guise of disinterestedness. If we assume that professionals are
particularly good at assessing what is in the public interest and particularly
well suited to avoid this kind of dynamic, then perhaps the fiduciary model
of prosecutorial power could avoid this critique. But ever since the 1970s,
scholars and critics have shown just how central professions and other
experts have been to just this sort of social control.193
That said, discretion in the exercise of government power is
inevitable.194 And discretion in the application of the criminal laws is no
exception. As we explained above, allowing the public direct control
over intrinsic factors that go into decisions in individual cases is not only
impracticable but also potentially dangerous.195 Thus, we are stuck with

189. Seth Davis, Pluralism and the Public Trust, in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT 281, 288–99
(Evan J. Criddle et al. eds, 2018).
190. See Davis, supra note 4, at 408–15 (describing prosecutors’ discretion and
abuses of such discretion that result in a level of control over the accused).
191. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 1–15 (2010) (likening the domination over people of color and the poor
that resulted from the “government’s zealous . . . efforts to address rampant drug crime”
during the War on Drugs beginning in the 1980s to the Jim Crow-era racial caste system).
192. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 4, at 400, 409–10 & n.63 (suggesting that prosecutors’
discretionary decisions may be the result of bias, like unconscious racism, and proposing
reforms to hold prosecutors accountable to their constituents).
193. See Roiphe, supra note 146, at 675, 677 (explaining scholars’ critique of lawyers
who “substitut[ed] their own political and ideological agenda[s] for those of the . . .
communit[ies] for whom they were purportedly fighting” and scholars’ increasing focus
on a theory of lawyers as “zealous advocate[s]” and “minimiz[ing of] the professional
obligation to society as a whole”).
194. H. L. A. Hart, Discretion, 127 HARV. L. REV. 652, 663–64 (2013).
195. See supra Section III.A.2.
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Paul Miller’s definition of a fiduciary.196 A more direct control over
prosecution would risk partisan influence or a powerful faction
controlling prosecutors’ decisions. It could also involve those without
experience or knowledge who will likely act in an arbitrary way
inconsistent with the public interest in criminal justice.
Independence should be protected when it can foster expertise,
experience, and professional pride. While they should never go
unchecked, these aspects can be harnessed to promote processes and
norms that will tend toward good social outcomes. In order to do that,
prosecutors and public officials in general need to be insulated from the
public. But, expertise is not infallible; experience is not incorruptible. To
make sure that these processes do not get coopted or ignored for the
private ends of individual officials or corrupted by implicit bias and other
distortions in decision making, the public has a right to monitor their
public officials. The proper degree of input and control from the public
will depend on the particular official and the nature of his or her role.
Some functions are better performed in isolation, protected from public
clamor; others are better aired in public, performed in collaboration
with the beneficiary.
With regard to prosecutors, the best way to ensure this balance is to
insulate prosecutors in making discretionary decisions in individual
cases but require them to be more deliberate, rational, and transparent
in developing processes to make these decisions. In addition to
implementing regular procedures, prosecutors’ offices should be
transparent both about the policies motivating their decisions and how
the decisions are made.
Bringing this insight to bear on the fiduciary theory of governance in
general leads to the conclusion that the nature of the fiduciary
relationship between public officials and the electorate is complex and
depends on the nature of the office. The best way to ensure faithful
principals is by employing all possible mechanisms to ensure that the
official is accountable to the public in a way that respects and preserves
the unique nature of his or her expertise and experience.197 While the

196. See Miller, supra note 187, at 262 (defining a fiduciary relationship as “one in
which one party (the fiduciary) enjoys discretionary power over the significant practical
interests of another (the beneficiary)” (emphasis added)).
197. Evan Criddle has essentially made this argument about federal administrative
agencies. Under the fiduciary model, administrative agencies are not anti-democratic
but rather fiduciaries. The key in the relationship is to foster accountability while
preserving an arena for expert deliberation. Criddle, supra note 51, at 447–49.
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mechanism of doing so will vary depending on the official’s role and
responsibilities, the goal remains constant.
Political officials ought to educate the public about the role of
different officials and institution and avoid spreading misinformation
that might undermine the norms that have developed over the years.198
In order to enhance accountability, public officials who are in the right
position to do so should clarify what the norms and processes that govern
their role are and why they are necessary for the proper functioning of
government.199 A faithful public servant should be responsible not just for
making decisions according to these norms and traditions but for
educating the public about how important they are.200
CONCLUSION
This Article introduces the fiduciary theory of prosecution not as a
fully developed proposal but as an invitation for further inquiry. In
addition to reframing old debates in a new and potentially helpful way,
the theory raises novel questions about how prosecutors ought to

198. Many have accused the Trump Administration of failing to live up to this
responsibility. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, The Trump Team is Running a Disinformation
Campaign About Russian Interference, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Aug. 1, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/08/01/the-trump-teamsvast-disinformation-campaign-about-russian-interference; Max Boot, Donald Trump’s
Biggest Disinformation Campaign Yet, FOREIGN POL’Y: VOICE (Oct. 31, 2017),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/31/donald-trumps-biggest-disinformationcampaign-yet [https://perma.cc/VDJ8-DENF]; David Rhode, How Disinformation
Reaches Donald Trump, NEW YORKER: NEWS DESK (Oct. 3, 2019),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-disinformation-reaches-donaldtrump [https://perma.cc/N3VY-NLY3].
199. Some officials seem to intuit this role. In giving a press conference after charging
Michael Cohen—President Trump’s personal lawyer—in federal court, Deputy United
States Attorney Rob Khuzami not only announced the charges but also explained the
importance of the laws and the equal application of those laws. Robert Khuzami
Statement on Michael Cohen Case, CSPAN (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.cspan.org/video/?450331-1/lead-prosecutor-speaks-reporters-michael-cohen-guiltyplea [https://perma.cc/MKP2-P4L3] (“The rule of law applies . . . . It is our commitment
[as law enforcement] that we will pursue . . . those who choose to break the law and
vindicate the majority of people who lead law-abiding lives . . . . The message is that we
are here, prosecutors are here . . . we are a nation of laws and the essence [of] . . . this
case . . . is justice[:] . . . that is[,] an equal playing field for all persons in the eyes of the
law.”).
200. See Bruce A. Green & Russell G. Pearce, “Public Service Must Begin at Home”: The
Lawyer as Civics Teacher in Everyday Practice, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1207, 1211–13
(2009) (describing lawyers as civics teachers who have “an obligation to convey to
clients [their] understanding of proper civic conduct”).
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function and offers broad outlines to be filled in. We invite others to join
us in developing this theory, which, unlike other theories of prosecution,
is firmly rooted in history and tradition.
The principle value of the fiduciary theory of prosecution is not
prescriptive in the following sense. It does not tell prosecutors what to
do, except perhaps when it comes to extreme conduct that prosecutors
should avoid under virtually any understanding of their function.
Because it places discretion at the center of prosecutors’ work and asks
prosecutors to act in service of an amorphous beneficiary with a vague
objective, it cannot dictate particular decisions in concrete situations.
The theory does prescribe, in broad outline, how prosecutors should
reach decisions, but not the decisions they should ultimately reach. In
other words, a fiduciary theory of prosecution requires a certain process
for decision making but not particular outcomes. Observers cannot use
the theory to evaluate or critique charging or plea-bargaining decisions
because the relevant facts about prosecutors’ decision-making
processes will rarely be available. Nor does the theory, in itself, help
answer whether traditional, progressive, or other styles of prosecuting
are preferable.
The theory’s value is primarily explanatory. To begin with, the fiduciary
theory makes sense of, and legitimates, conventional understandings of the
prosecutor’s role, including the idea of prosecution as a public trust, the
requirement of prosecutorial independence, and most importantly, the
prosecutorial duty to seek justice. The theory offers insight into the
meaning and significance of the vague duty to seek justice and underscores
that, as fiduciaries, prosecutors have further duties—in particular, duties of
care and loyalty. These other duties are not themselves elements of
“justice” but rather are legal imperatives governing how prosecutors
should pursue justice. Further, the theory offers a new distinction between
prosecutors’ pursuit of justice as opposed to other relevant social policy
objectives (while acknowledging that the distinctions are not always clear
and that there is sometimes overlap), and it gives priority to the pursuit
of conventional criminal justice interests. Consequently, the theory both
gives greater clarity to the defining concept of “seeking justice” and
shows how and why there is more to prosecutors’ work than this
pursuit.
Fiduciary theory also contributes to our understanding of how to
regulate prosecutors. By demonstrating that accountability and
independence are two mechanisms designed to align prosecutors’
interests with those of the public, fiduciary theory suggests regulatory
reforms that maximize both. Scholars and critics of the criminal justice
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system often point to the insulation of prosecutors from outside
regulation as cause for concern. This may be true, but any effort at
reform must be careful not to sacrifice too much in prosecutorial
independence for the sake of transparency or direct public
accountability because independence, too, is essential in aligning
prosecutors’ work with the interest of the beneficiary.
And perhaps most importantly, fiduciary theory helps justify some
features of prosecuting that many find frustrating, including that
different prosecutors evidently take different approaches to
discretionary decision making, resulting in disparate outcomes on
similar facts; that prosecutors often seem to act undemocratically,
ignoring public preferences; and that prosecutors often give no
explanations for the controversial decisions they make. These
frustrations are understandable and, to some extent, can be addressed.
As we suggest, both internal and external processes can strike a better
balance between prosecutors’ accountability and independence.
Further, the processes for training, electing, appointing, and hiring
prosecutors can better identify lawyers who will exercise good
judgment in their fiduciary role. But, in the end, the fiduciary theory
reminds us that the essential features of prosecutorial decision making
and regulation, which may give one pause, are neither arbitrary nor the
product of a political process in which prosecutors have accumulated
power for its own sake. These features grow out of a long legal tradition,
undergirded by a theory, that casts prosecutors as fiduciaries, a
professional role with significant substantive and procedural
implications. With prosecutors’ power, comes fiduciary responsibilities.
And that should be a source of some comfort.
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